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Preface
The paper ‘Yardstick competition for multi-product hospitals’, is the first 
paper in the Research Paper Series by the Dutch Healthcare Authority 
(NZa). The Research Paper Series aims at the enhancement of the 
knowledge en expertise in the regulation of and competition in health 
care markets. The papers in this series are written by invited authors 
and/or NZa staff.
In 2005, the segment of uncomplicated, elective outpatient care has been 
deregulated. Prices in this segment are subject to bargaining between 
insurers and hospitals. However, the major part of hospital production is 
currently still regulated a budget system. The Ministry of Health is 
proposing to deregulate the remainder of elective hospital care (including 
inpatient elective care).  Within the current competitive domain, insurers 
are unable to use their countervailing power in reducing inefficiency and 
profit margins and moving bargaining outcomes toward the competitive 
equilibrium. Therefore, regulation will be introduced as a transitory 
element on the road towards a market oriented health care market.
The paper ‘Yardstick competition for multi-product hospitals’ analyzes the 
properties of possible regulation schemes for hospitals. The paper 
provides a formalized description and analysis of the proposed regulation 
of Dutch hospitals by NZa. The paper analyses the consequences of two 
proposed regulation models on cost reduction incentives, the production 
level and mix of hospitals, cost of regulation, innovation and quality.
The paper shows that yardstick competition gives clear cost reduction 
incentives, as well incentives to undertake cost reduction innovations in 
the transitory phase. The two analyzed models differ in the limitation of 
potential hospital bargaining power, robustness to collusion and 
administrative cost.
A theoretical drawback is that the regulation may distort the production 
level and production mix by hospitals. However, the paper argues that 
these effects are not  harmful in practice and that the regulation will lead 
to a reallocation of production from inefficient hospitals to efficient 
hospitals. This reallocation will beneficial for obtaining a more competitive 
outcome.
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The paper is written by two invited authors: Per Agrell (professor at the 
Louvain School of Management, Université catholique de Louvain in 
Belgium) and Peter Bogetoft (professor of Economics at Royal Veterinary 
and Agricultural University KVL in Denmark), in combination with two NZa 
employees: Misja Mikkers and Rein Halbersma, both of the unit Economic 
Analysis. 
The paper has been discussed with economists of the NZa Council of 
Advisors. The authors would like to thank professors Henk Don, Sweder 
van Wijnbergen, Erik Schut and Jan-Willem Velthuijsen for comments that 
lead to many improvements.
Frank de Grave
Chairman of the Executive Board
Dutch Healthcare Authority
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Samenvatting in het Nederlands
In 2005 en 2006 zijn er ingrijpende hervormingen in de Nederlandse 
gezondheidszorg doorgevoerd. In 2005 is een voorzichtig begin gemaakt 
met de introductie van vrije prijsonderhandelingen tussen ziekenhuizen 
en zorgverzekeraars voor 10% van de ziekenhuisproductie. Voor de 
overige 90% van de ziekenhuisproductie is er ook in 2007 nog geen 
prijsconcurrentie en worden de prijzen gereguleerd. De minister van VWS 
stelt voor vanaf 2008 het resterende deel van de electieve zorg verder te 
dereguleren zodat vanaf 2011 voor het leeuwendeel van de electieve zorg 
vrije prijsconcurrentie mogelijk wordt. 
Op dit moment hebben verzekeraars nog onvoldoende onderhandelings-
macht om een betere prijs/kwaliteit verhouding af te dwingen. Daarom 
stelt de minister van VWS voor een tijdelijk prijsplafond te introduceren. 
Het tijdelijk prijsplafond dat de NZa daartoe heeft ontworpen, is een 
competitief mechanisme geïnspireerd op het maatstafsysteem van 
Shleifer (1985). Het idee achter het maatstafsysteem van Shleifer is dat 
prijzen per product op de sectorgemiddelde kosten per product worden 
gebaseerd. Dit geeft ondernemingen een individuele prikkel om de kosten 
de verlagen. Met deze stimulans tot kostenverlaging wordt alvast 
gesimuleerd wat onder vrije prijsconcurrentie ook zal gaan ontstaan: een 
doelmatige en kwalitatief goede productie van zorg.
In dit artikel worden verschillende reguleringsmodellen geanalyseerd die 
gebaseerd zijn op het genoemde maatstafsysteem, maar dan toegepast 
op de Nederlandse situatie waarin zorgaanbieders in een complexe 
onderhandelingsomgeving opereren met onderhandelingen meerdere 
verzekeraars over duizenden producten (DBC’s). Vanuit een oogpunt van 
administratieve lastenverlichting is gekozen om de regulering te laten 
aangrijpen op de gehele bundel van DBC’s, en niet per DBC afzonderlijk. 
Dergelijke maatstafmodellen waren tot voor kort niet of nauwelijks 
bekend in de economische literatuur. Daarom heeft de unit Economische 
Analyse van de NZa in samenwerking met de academische onderzoekers 
Per Agrell en Peter Bogetoft de prikkelwerking en waarschijnlijke 
marktuitkomsten van het voorgestelde prijsplafond onderzocht. Dit artikel 
doet verslag van de bevindingen van dit onderzoek.
In een van de geanalyseerde varianten van het prijsplafondmodel wordt 
de maatstaf gebaseerd op de gemiddelde kosten per geproduceerde 
productbundel. De herverdeling van de totale sectorkosten geschiedt in 
dit model op basis van het aandeel van ieder ziekenhuis in de gewogen 
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totale sectorproductie. In dit model worden geen prijzen van individuele 
producten en geen afzonderlijke verzekeraar-zorgaanbieder relaties 
gereguleerd: alleen het overall prijsniveau van een zorgaanbieder dient 
onder het prijsplafond te blijven. 
Zorgaanbieders worden uiteraard wel gecompenseerd voor niet-
beïnvloedbare verschillen in de mix van de producten die ze produceren. 
Anders zouden instellingen die relatief dure producten leveren immers 
benadeeld worden. Door het prijsplafond op te hogen (of te verlagen) met 
een zogeheten casemixindex, wordt dit probleem omzeild en wordt tevens 
specialisatie lonend. De casemixindex wordt berekend als een gewogen 
volume van de verschillende DBC’s. De gewichten waarmee de 
verschillende DBC’s bij elkaar worden opgeteld, worden bepaald op basis 
van de relatieve zwaarte en schaarste. Productie van relatieve dure en 
complexe DBC’s leidt dus tot een hoge casemixindex en een navenante 
verhoging van het prijsplafond. De casemixgewichten worden periodiek 
aangepast op basis van nieuwe producten, onderhandelde prijzen en 
wachtlijstgegevens.
Deze kostengeoriënteerde variant van het prijsplafondmodel geeft 
individuele zorgaanbieders een prikkel om efficiënter te opereren, onder 
de veronderstelling dat zorgaanbieders hun nut op rationele wijze 
maximaliseren. Deze prikkel bestaat er voor zowel de korte als de langere 
termijn. Tevens wordt aangetoond dat het model de onderhandelings-
macht van zorgaanbieders verlaagt. In het artikel wordt bovendien 
aangetoond onder welke voorwaarden (de mate van vraagelasticiteit en 
de functionele vorm van de kostenfunctie) het model tot verstoringen in 
de productie leidt. Een deel van deze verstoringen is vanuit welvaarts-
oogpunt wenselijk in de zin dat er een herallocatie van productie 
plaatsvindt van relatief inefficiënte zorgaanbieders naar meer efficiënte 
aanbieders. Wanneer er verondersteld wordt dat de vraag betrekkelijk 
inelastisch is en in aanmerking genomen dat de overige, ongewenste, 
verstoringen betrekkelijk klein zijn, kan geconcludeerd worden dat de 
totale verstoringen geen grote negatieve gevolgen hebben. Het 
herallocatie-effect is gunstig leidt tot een leidt tot een meer competitieve 
uitkomst. 
Een tweede geanalyseerde variant van het prijsplafondmodel is sterk 
vergelijkbaar met het eerste model, met dit verschil dat de maatstaf 
wordt gebaseerd op de onderhandelde prijzen in plaats van op de 
gerealiseerde kosten. Het model leidt tot vergelijkbare prikkels voor 
zorgaanbieders, maar de mate waarin de efficiëntieprikkels zich 
manifesteren in lagere onderhandelingsmacht van zorgaanbieders en 
prijzen is onzeker. Historische prijzen kunnen makkelijk als richtprijzen 
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worden gehanteerd, waardoor een transitie naar meer competitieve 
prijzen uit kan blijven. In dit model is collusie daardoor makkelijker dan 
de kostengebaseerde maatstaf. Daarbij geeft het mechanisme pas 
duidelijke prikkels wanneer de maatstaf achteraf wordt vastgesteld. Dit 
leidt echter weer tot meer onzekerheid bij zorgaanbieders. 
De kostengebaseerde maatstaf leidt tot hogere reguleringskosten dan de 
prijsgeoriënteerde variant, doordat de toezichthouder informatie nodig 
heeft over de gestandaardiseerde kosten per zorgaanbieder. Deze 
administratieve lasten kunnen sterk verminderd te worden door aan-
sluiting te zoeken bij informatie die reeds om andere doeleinden worden 
verzameld. Bovendien is de kostengebaseerde variant nog altijd veel 
minder ingrijpend dan het huidige systeem van afzonderlijke tarieven per 
DBC.
Elk model met sterke efficiëntieprikkels kan leiden tot een onder-
investering in innovatie. Het effect van deze onderinvestering wordt 
gemitigeerd doordat de prikkels voor zorgaanbieders om van innovatie te 
leren en over te nemen sterker worden. Het effect van onderinvestering 
kan verder worden verminderd door aparte innovatiecontracten met 
bijvoorbeeld academische ziekenhuizen te sluiten, zoals dat nu al 
gebruikelijk is in Nederland.
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Abstract
Health care provision is undergoing major reforms in Europe as a reaction 
to rapidly increasing expenditure and lowered political acceptance to 
commit public finance to cover the deficits. The Dutch government will 
decide in 2007 if the current budget system will be replaced by a more 
competitive mechanism, based on the yardstick regulation principle by 
Shleifer (1985). 
One of the proposed systems for the reform can be compared to a 
revenue-cap implementation of a multi-product cost-yardstick 
mechanism. The redistribution of the sector’s relevant cost is made in 
proportion to the individual hospitals share of total weighted output. No 
regulation is made of the multi-lateral contractual relations between 
users, insurers and hospitals. The scaling weights are updated periodically 
for new services and as a function of observed excess demand (waiting 
lists). 
The mechanism is shown to provide cost-reducing (effort-inducing) 
incentives for profit-maximizing rational agents in a single-period 
bargaining game. The game also shows that the regulation acts as a 
countervailing power for the insurers to reinforce bargaining power. The 
local distortion of the output profile induced by the regulation is a function 
of demand elasticity and cost function convexity. In case the revenue 
target is not binding, no welfare loss is incurred. The regime also provides 
incentives for cost-reducing investments in the short and the long run. 
These incentives manifest themselves in local reallocations of output to 
more efficient producers.
The analysis shows that care should be taken in the updating of the 
weights as to provide incentives for service innovation, as well as to 
guarantee convergence of the price system. Although this requires 
econometric analyses, the alternative with a cost-based yardstick is 
considered superior to a revenue-based ditto for this application.
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1.  Introduction
1.1 Background
The Dutch health care sector is undergoing major reforms. In reforming 
the Dutch health care sector from an incumbent low-powered budgeting 
regime towards a more high-powered incentive regime, a number of 
instruments are deployed in the Health Market Design Act (WMG), mainly 
structural as to promote both supply-side and demand-side competition. 
The Dutch Healthcare Authority (NZa) has elaborated and documented a 
proposed regulation regime for hospital reimbursement based on an 
adjusted service bundle price yardstick. In all, four projects aim at the 
theoretical, behavioral and practical analysis of the specific proposal as to 
investigate its feasibility and appropriateness for a potential implemen-
tation in 2008. The current paper is one of the research projects in the 
reform process, aiming at a theoretical investigation of the economic 
soundness of the chosen instrument.
1.2 Objectives
The goals this paper are to investigate if the proposed regulations with 
respect to:
— Feasibility in a complex multi-product industry
—  Economic soundness of the motivation and coordination features of the 
proposal
—  Existence of an equilibrium for some reasonable parameter settings 
within the proposal 
1.3 Contribution
The paper extends the earlier literature on yardstick competition in 
healthcare provision by treating the multi-product dimension through a 
weighted output index. Whereas earlier work mainly has been focused on 
either detailed price-cap approaches per DRG with periodic updating or 
aggregate frontier estimates, the paper proposes an implementable 
solution that limits regulatory burden for suppliers in the pricing game to 
observing negotiated contracts, realized output, audited total costs and 
the excess demand function (waiting lists). 
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The paper also provides new insights into the state of current European 
healthcare reform programs under institutional diversity. 
1.4 Outline
The outline of the paper is as follows. Chapter 2 gives a short introduction 
to the health care sector in the Netherlands, in particular to the hospital 
sector and the incumbent regulation. Chapter 3 formalizes the 
relationships in a base model and it captures the combined usage of 
regulation and bilateral negotiations by a constrained bargaining 
framework. The basic properties of the proposals are derived in Chapter 
4. Chapter 5 provides a model-independent discussion on incentives for 
innovation and quality incentives in the new regime. Chapter 6 closes the 
paper with some conclusions.
1
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2.  Health care in the Netherlands
In this section, we present some key details about the Dutch health care 
sector and the current reforms.
Since the last few years, the Dutch health care system is being 
reorganized. For this paper, the introduction of competition in the hospital 
sector in 2005 and the reorganization of the health insurance system in 
2006 are of particular importance. The reforms are based on a model of 
managed competition with mandatory insurance for all Dutch citizens. 
The basic idea is that hospitals compete for contracts with insurers and 
insures compete for contracts with consumers.
A major reason for the market oriented reforms is the public 
dissatisfaction with the negative effects of rationing (such as waiting lists) 
induced by the current cost containment policies (see Schut and Van de 
Ven, 2005). 
2.1 The health insurance market
The coverage of the mandatory insurance is a basic package defined by 
law, that includes all essential medical care. There is an optional 
additional insurance covering all health services not included in the basic 
package (De Jong and Mosca, 2006). The mandatory insurance aims to 
guarantee universal access to the health care system. 
Insurers have to accept any client regardless of gender, state of health, 
age etc., without room for price discrimination and risk screening. 
A refined risk adjustment system is in place to compensate insurance 
companies for cost differences induced by socio-demographic factors, 
such as age, sex, income, location and prior health care consumption 
(chronic pharmaceutical dependencies and prior hospitalization) (see 
Schut and Van de Ven, 2005). 
The premium for the new insurance consists of two components: 
a nominal premium of around 1,000 Euro and an income related premium 
of 6.5% of the income up to an income ceiling of 30,015 Euro (De Jong 
and Mosca, 2006). The income related premiums are collected through 
payroll and income taxes and are redistributed through the risk-
adjustment system. 
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The risk adjustment system levels the playing field for health insurers by 
enabling price competition on the nominal premium rates (see Schut and 
Van de Ven, 2005).
Another important characteristic is that insurers are obliged to make sure 
that their enrollees get the necessary treatments within a certain time 
and geographic area. In other words, insurers are obliged to contract 
sufficient care, given the demand of their enrollees.
Health insurers are privately owned (both for profit and not for profit). 
Many are part of larger holding companies within the financial sector, with 
access to capital markets. Following the introduction of the new insurance 
competition, a few mergers between the largest players have reduced the 
market to four large national insurers (with about 80% of the entire 
market) and a handful of smaller national or regional players.
2.2 Hospital budgeting
The Dutch government plans a step by step introduction of price 
competition between hospitals. The introduction of competition in the 
health care sector has been long debated. For a thorough discussion of 
the political decision making process leading to the recent reforms, we 
refer to Helderman et al. (2005). In this section, we will shortly describe 
the most relevant changes for this paper.
The current budget system (which is called ‘Functional Budget System’) 
was introduced in 1983 to contain hospital cost. The budget was set by 
the legal precursor of the NZA, the National Health Tariff Authority 
(‘CTG’). Hospital budgets were based on a small number of ‘parameters’, 
such as the number of inhabitants in the surrounding area, the number of 
beds, specialists and assistant-doctors and three broad measures of 
production: the number of outpatient visits, inpatient visits and overnight 
stays. All these parameters were expressed in monetary units. 
Within their budget constraint, hospitals bargained with the collective of 
insurers on local production plans. As the National Health Tariff Authority 
set administrative tariffs on hospital products, only the production 
volumes and quality could be freely negotiated. Furthermore, hospitals 
and insurers were mutually obliged to contract with each other.
1
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2.3 Liberalising hospital-insurer contracting
In 2005 two major changes were introduced. First, a new hospital 
payment system was implemented based on Diagnosis Treatment 
Combinations (DBC’s). A DBC is a product definition based on a medical 
description and contains the whole inpatient and outpatient activities 
(Haeck, 2005). 
Second, since 2005, the segment of uncomplicated, elective outpatient 
care has been deregulated. First, prices in the competitive segment are 
no longer set by the National Health Tariff Authority, but are subject to 
bargaining. Second, the bargaining process is no longer multilateral but 
bilateral, with no mutual obligation to close any contract. 
This competitive segment consists of 1376 different DBC’s. Since some 
DBC’s are almost identical, the group of DBC’s in the competitive segment 
can be clustered to 145 different products (See CTG/ZAio, 2005). The 
DBC’s in the competitive segment cover 15 (out of 24) different medical 
specializations and belong to 28 different diagnoses. 
The revenue of the competitive segment is approximately 1.1 billion Euro, 
which is about 8% of the total expenditure on hospital care. To eliminate 
the revenue associated with the competitive segment from the 
prospective budgets for the regulated segment, the Dutch Healthcare 
Authority estimated cost prices (i.e. average unit cost) for the products, 
based on a survey of a group of 12 hospitals and multiplied these cost 
prices with the estimated volumes. 
Apart from hospitals, there are also so-called Independent Treatment 
Centers (ZBC’s) active in the market for hospital care. These ZBC’s are 
small outpatient treatment centers which have been allowed in the market 
since 1998. However, ZBC’s are only allowed to provide treatments that 
do not require an overnight stay in the hospitals, so they do not compete 
on the whole range of elective care products. 
2.4 The need for transitory regulation
The major part of the hospital production is currently still regulated by 
the old budget system. Currently, the Ministry of Health is proposing to 
deregulate the remainder of elective hospital care (including inpatient 
elective care), estimated to be 70% of hospital production. The goal is to 
introduce more incentives for efficiency in order to guarantee sustainable 
health care expenditures for the long run.
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The results from first two years of market incentives in the small 
competitive segment have been mixed, however. The National Healthcare 
Authority (CTG-Zaio 2005 and CTG-Zaio 2006) monitored the price 
developments for the elective outpatient hospital care and established 
that there was a net real price increase over the two year period, albeit 
with a small real price decrease in the second year
A more detailed analysis by the NZa (CTG-Zaio, 2006) established that 
the underlying bargaining process currently relatively favors hospitals 
over insurers. The econometric evidence points towards supernormal 
profit margins for hospitals and Nash bargaining outcomes significantly 
different from the competitive equilibrium. 
Within the current competitive domain, insurers are unable to use their 
countervailing power in reducing profit margins and moving bargaining 
outcomes towards the competitive equilibrium. This is most obvious from 
the fact that almost every insurer contracts with almost every hospital, 
even though they are under no obligation to do so. This undermines the 
credibility of threatening to move patients towards hospitals with the best 
price-quality ratios.
Insurers indicate that they cannot yet credibly threaten to move patients 
towards their preferred providers for several reasons. First, the lack of 
transparent hospital quality information gives patients little incentive to 
overcome additional travel time. Second, insurers are legally restricted to 
significantly differentiate reimbursements across providers. Finally, 
patients currently seem to value freedom of choice over lower premiums.
Finally, almost the entire hospital sector has been without incentive 
regulation for several decades. Market parties have had little time to 
reach some sort of long run competitive equilibrium. The new proposed 
hospital regulation system in the Netherlands is meant to be a transitory 
element on the road towards a more fully market oriented healthcare 
market. 
1
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3.  Base model
To get a better idea of the proposed regulation, we start by formalizing 
the basic relationship between production, costs and price-caps. We shall 
next combine this with an outline of likely objectives of the parties 
involved, viz. the users (insurance companies), the hospitals and the 
regulator. Lastly, the base formula and the objectives are developed into 
a more refined constrained bargaining model.
3.1 Economic entities
The framework involves three types of economic actors, the regulator, 
hospitals and users. A user here involves a combined entity of patients 
that use a given insurance company. The entity indirectly involves general 
practitioners (GP) as well since we presume that the GPs remain 
responsible for the visitation of patients to the hospitals, cf. below. 
We shall not model the possible internal conflicts and informational 
asymmetries within the user group. Likewise, the hospital entity here 
involves both a hospital and the physicians involved. Bogetoft and Mikkers 
(2006) show that from the point of view of incentivizing the hospital and  
physicians, it is often attractive to look at them as an integrated entity – 
or at least to contract with the physicians via the hospitals. 
The regulator serves as a market maker that puts restriction on the 
contracts and payment plans that individual hospitals and users can 
choose. 
The three entities are illustrated in Figure 3-1 below.
 
Regulator
User
Patient
Hospital
Hospital
Physician
GP
Insurer
 
Figure -1 Economic entities
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3.2 Production, costs, and revenues
Let there be H hospitals each involved in the production of up to D DBCs. 
The production at hospital h, h=1,..,H, of DBCs d, d=1,..D, is denoted yhd 
and the vector of outputs from hospital h is denoted Yh, i.e.
yh=(yh1,...yhD)
Since not all hospitals offer the full range of possible treatments, some of 
these dimensions are typically zero. Also, the period of production shall 
be suppressed but it will be introduced when we discuss lagged models 
below. We shall think of the productions yh, h=1,...,H as being realized as 
opposed to planned, and we shall assume that they are verifiable.
The total revenue of hospital h is denoted Rh and the total cost is Ch. Both 
are assumed to be verifiable through normal auditing procedures. The 
total hospital cost include all operational and capital costs used in 
providing the produced DBCs. In particular, operational costs include (the 
currently separately accounted) physicians’ fees and the capital costs 
include not only depreciation of fixed assets but also standardized cost of 
equity and debt.
Since hospitals potentially produce services other than DBCs (e.g. 
research, teaching), and since not all DBCs will fall under the proposed 
regulation (e.g. experimental care), it will be necessary to develop 
uniform and unambiguous accounting rules to split hospital revenues and 
costs across the several regulatory segments.
We shall in general not assume that the any more specific revenue 
elements are verifiable. One rather obvious extension is to assume that 
the revenue of hospital h can be split according to the user u=1,…,U 
paying it 
R Rh uhu= /
Here Ruh is shorthand for the revenue paid by user u to hospital h.
We will not assume that the regulator can observe the contracts signed 
between users and hospitals. In consequence, the regulator is not 
assumed to use information about the principles according to which 
payments are setteled. The revenue Ruh can for example result from a 
contract with a fixed payment for a given capacity, a payment per DBC or 
some combination.
0
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3.3 Cost based ex ante regulation
The proposed regulation, the cost based ex ante regulation, shall now be 
formalized. Some obvious variants, cost based ex post as well as revenue 
based ex ante or ex post regulations will be discussed at the end of this 
chapter.
Weights
The proposed regulation is based on DBC weights 
w=(w1,...,wD)
The weights are set by the regulator and intended to reflect relative 
scarcity or cost of different DBCs.
Average DBC-adjusted price-cap
The proposed scheme suggests that the average DBC price in any given 
hospital cannot exceed the average DBC price in the sector when 
corrected for case mix. Using the notation above, this can be formulated 
into the following requirement for hospital h
y
R
y
C
w y y
w y y
*
*
*
*
* *
* *
h d
d
h
hd
dh h
h
h h
d hd
dh h
hd
dh h
d h d
d
h d
d
4#
!
!
! !
/ //
/
// //
/ /
The left hand side is the revenue of hospital h* per DBC volume. The DBC 
volume is a simple summation of the treatments provided at a given 
hospital and it therefore does not reflect the hospital’s degree of 
specialization. On the right hand side, the first fraction is the industry 
wide cost per DBC volume, while the last fraction, the case mix index, is 
intended to correct for the fact that the case mix of hospital h* may be 
more or less resource demanding than the industry mix.
Quality of treatments is not mentioned explicitly in the above formulation. 
At this point, however, this is without loss of generality since one can 
simply differentiate treatments according to quality, i.e. assume that two 
DBCs may represent the same treatment at different quality levels. This 
presumes of course that quality is verifiable at the treatment level. If this 
is not the case, alternative adjustments may be needed.
Observe also that we have excluded the hospital in question, h*, from the 
determination of the industry wide average cost and volume calculations. 
This is in accordance with a basic idea in the yardstick literature, namely 
Yardstick competition for multi-product hospitals

that a unit should not be able to affects its own benchmark. In reality and 
with a reasonable number of hospitals, this refinement may not matter 
much1. 
Associated revenue cap function
Although the yardstick scheme is formulated as a price cap requirement, 
it can be convenient analytically to think of it as an revenue cap system in 
which the revenue cap is a (linear) function of the ex post realized 
volume. This is radically different from a fixed budgeting system where a 
revenue cap has no volume dependence. Reformulating the above, we see 
that the associated revenue cap function for hospital h* is effectively
R y C y w
y w
* *
*
*
*
h h h
h h h
h h
hCAP 4=
!
!
_ i / /
where the revenue cap function for hospital h*, RCAPh* (.) is the maximal 
sum of charges it can make as a function of the services it provides. In 
the following we will loosely denote the associated revenue cap function 
as a revenue cap, but this is not to be understood as a fixed budget 
imposed on the hospital.
The revenue cap function can be rewritten into
R y y w y w
C
* * *
*
*
h h h
h
h h
h
h hCAP 4=
!
!_ ]i h/
/
This suggests the following interpretation of the system: The regulator 
sets the weights, w, equal to the relative values of the different services, 
and the actual costs level in the industry serves to calibrate the absolute 
level. If actual costs C* hh h!/  exceeds the costs stipulated by the 
regulator, y w* hh h!/ , then the allowed charges are increased with the 
same percentage and vice versa.
We note also that the revenue cap function is linear. This means that 
there it increases in direct proportion to the number of DBCs, i.e. it is a 
constant return to scale scheme, and that the rate of substitution 
between DBCs is constant (independent of specialization etc), i.e. that the 
iso-revenue curves are linear. 
1  The current number of full-scale hospitals is around 100, with an additional 
130 outpatient treatment centers.
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3.4 Objectives
To predict the effects of using the above revenue cap formula, we need to 
make assumptions about the motives of the parties involved. We shall 
now discuss these motives.
Hospital objectives
Let us assume that the hospital can affect the resulting costs according to 
the cost function Ch*(yh*,eh). Here, the variable eh represents the non-
verifiable workload in activity coordination and local incentive alignment 
among categories of staff within the hospital. It is traditionally referred to 
as “effort” for simplicity. Also, let vh*(e) be the cost of effort in monetary 
equivalents. 
The behavior of the hospital will depend on its overall motives. The 
classical assumption in the yardstick literature is that firms are profit 
maximizing. In reality this is far from always the situation, and, especially 
in Dutch hospitals, we can image other objectives such as revenue 
maximization or volume maximization. 
Currently, all hospitals in the Netherlands are private not-for-profit by law. 
The Healthcare Providers Entry Act (WTZi) allows the introduction of the 
profit motive from 2012 onwards. Nevertheless, even in market oriented 
countries as the U.S., the vast majority of hospitals are either publicly 
operated or private not-for-profit. The health economics literature (Sloan, 
2000) suggests that private ownership matters more than the profit 
motive as far as performance and quality are concerned. To facilitate 
further analysis, we first impose the profit motive and will relax this 
assumption later on.
In general, not-for-profit hospitals may not want to cut costs, but rather 
maximize “slack”, i.e. usage of resources on non-market goods or usage 
of resources at uncompetitive prices2. This could for example be better 
working conditions for the employees or extra non-verifiable quality of 
treatments. Also, they may only be partially concerned about cost 
reduction and profit maximization, namely to minimizes bankruptcy risk. 
Despite of a multiplicity of goals, a hospital must in the end care about 
the continuity of operations.
2  E.g., a not-for-profit hospital maximizing a linear combination of profit and 
revenue can be regarded as a profit maximizing hospital with an artificially 
lowered internal cost function (Lakdawalla and Philipson, 1998).
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We start by assuming profit maximizing behavior, i.e. the hospital h* 
maximizes the net gains, i.e. it solves
 ,R y c y e v e
,
* * * * * * * *
Y e
h h h h h h h h
* *h h
max = - -_ _ _i i i%
Here Rh*(yh*) is the revenue function faced by the hospital. It will depend 
on the demand side and the regulation. If we assume that the hospital 
has all the bargaining power and that there is no uncertainty, we could 
assume it to equal Rh
CAP(yh*). We shall return to this below.
If we anchor the cost function at maximal effort (minimal slack), and work 
with a simple slack model where r is the value of 1 Euro slack, the 
hospital will solve 
R y s c y s R y c y s1
,
* * * * * * * * * * * *
Y S
h h h h h h h h
cap
h h h h
* *h h
max t t= + + = - --_ __ _ _ ^i i i i i h%
User objectives
Let B(yu) be the benefits to user (group) u from treatment profile yu. Also, 
let Ru(yu) be the payment of user group u – via insurance, taxes etc. We 
assume that user u tries to maximize net benefits, i.e.
maxB y R y
y u u u uu
-_ _i i
Regulator objectives
We may in general assume that the regulator strives to maximize social 
welfare, which here corresponds to a weighted sum of the users’ surplus 
and the producers’ surplus, i.e. (Baron and Myerson, 1982)
, ,W y e B y R y y e R uu u u uu h hhh uu uh m= - + -^ _ _ _ _h i i i i# -/ %/ /
Here, he [0,1] is the weight associated with the hospital surplus and m≥0 
is a parameter corresponding to the (tax distortions) cost of public funds. 
In the Netherlands, half of hospital costs are covered by insurance 
premiums and half by pay-roll taxes. 
As a benchmark, one may consider a first best situation, where the 
regulator has perfect information and is able to instruct the hospitals 
effort e, production y and payment R. In reality, the regulator is restricted 
by asymmetric information, and must settle with a second-best solution. 
In a second best solution, W is maximized subject to both individual 
rationality (IR) and incentive compatibility (IC) constraints ensuring that 
all hospitals are willing to participate and choose the planned efforts and 
productions and that the clients are willing to pay for the services.
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Let us assume that payment schemes are fixed as Rh(yh) for hospital h 
and Ruh(yuh) from user u to hospital h, i.e. we have
R y R yh h uh
u
uh=_ _i i/
We can therefore formulate the IR and IC conditions as 
 
,
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y e y e
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h
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Observe that in the proposed regulation, the regulator does not intend to 
regulate the payment plans in all details, only to influence the (price-level 
of the) overall payment Rh. This means that we shall ideally include IR and 
IC constraints corresponding to the choice of the exact payment schemes 
between individual users and hospitals, the Ruh(.) plans. The contemplated 
Ruh - plans must be individually rational and incentive compatible as well.
In the mechanism design literature, it is customary to maximize the 
regulator’s objective subject to the IR and IC constraints like above. This 
may lead to important insights in simplified settings, and in turn this may 
give useful benchmarks. In applied regulation, however, the stress is 
more on the complexity of the real setting, like the multiplicity of outputs 
in health, and the objective of maximizing social welfare becomes 
analytically too ambitious. We therefore focus  on the economic 
soundness of some specific approaches, i.e. we investigate if the more 
specific mechanisms proposed in the Dutch context lead to reasonable 
coordination of activities (production level, production mix etc) and 
reasonable motivation of the entities involved (incentives to minimize 
costs, make innovations etc)..
The regulation procedure
We close this section by refining the description of the proposed system. 
In addition to the basic price-cap formula, we need to understand the 
procedural usage of this. We shall therefore work with time-conditioned 
variables in this section.
The idea of the scheme is to work with price caps set ex ante based on 
past experience. This means that the associated revenue cap function 
would be known ex ante. Moreover, since the hospitals will only be held 
responsible for their total charges, the price caps only serves to calculate 
the revenue cap function which is the maximal allowed charge.
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The system in this way resembles an ex ante regulation with ex post 
volume adjustments. The ex ante known revenue cap for period t is given 
by 
R y y w y w
C
* * *
*
*
h t
CAP
h t h t
h t
h h
ht
h h
1
1
4=
!
!
-
-_ ]i h/
/
The idea of the scheme is to impose an upper bound on the overall price 
level, rather than to impose a fixed revenue target. That is, (1) if a 
hospital charges less than the revenue cap, nothing happens, and (2) if a 
hospital produces more volume it is allowed to earn more revenue. 
If, however, it charges more for its produced DBCs than the allowed price 
cap, and hence earns more than the associated revenue cap, it must 
repay the surcharges, possibly with some extra penalty a (in addition to 
interest), i.e. to repay in net present value (1+a)[Rh*t - R *h t
CAP (yh*t)]
It is clear, however, that unless penalties are very high, a hospital will 
indeed charge above the revenue cap, if it has enough market power over 
local insurers to do so. In consequence, the system would work like an ex 
ante revenue cap system with ex post adjustments for volume. It would 
therefore be similar to the standard regulation systems used to regulate 
for example distribution system operators in electricity. The main 
difference is that to cope with the many output dimensions, the system 
work with a simple weighting system to aggregate the outputs into one 
simple output.
The fact that surcharges may be repaid to the risk-adjustment fund and 
not necessarily to the users (the insurance companies) means a transfer 
from one insurer that pays too much to all insurers. More specifically, the 
charges R y R yh ht h uht
u
=_ _i i/  are compared to allowed charges R yht h tCAP _ i
and modified revenue R Yh ht
MOD _ i and user payments R yu utMOD _ i are 
calculated as
,
,
max
max
R y R y R y R y
R y R y R y R y
0 1
0 1
h ht h ht h ht h t h t
u ht u ht uh h ht h t h t
MOD CAP
MOD CAP
a
b a
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Here, ub is a measure of user u’s size compared to other users.
This will encourage the insurance companies to limit a hospitals payment 
to the yardstick level. One problem however is that a given hospital may 
contract with several insurance companies and that individually they may 
free ride in the bargaining.
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The above redistribution scheme collects the total surcharges of all 
hospitals and distributes the aggregate surcharges across all insurers 
proportional to their size (as measured by e.g. their aggregate demands). 
An alternative is to redistribute surcharges per hospital across all locally 
involved insurers proportional to their size in that hospital. The user 
payments would become
,maxR y R y R y R y0 1ht u ht uh
h
h ht h t h t
CAP
u
MOD b a= - + -_ _ ] _ _i i g i i8 B% //
Here, buh is a measure of user u’s size in hospital h compared to other 
local users.
The full game
The timing of the resulting game in a given period is as follows:
—  The regulator announces price caps for period t (or equivalently, the 
revenue cap functions R yht h t
CAP _ i) for the different hospitals.
—  The hospital and users negotiate payment schemes Ruht(yuht) for the 
different users and hospitals.
—  Users choose service levels, yuht, and hospital effort levels eht.
—  Realized charges R y R yh ht uh
u
uht=_ _i i/  are compared to allowed 
 charges R yht h t
CAP _ i and modified revenue R yh htMOD _ i and user   
 
 payments R yu ut
MOD _ i are calculated
—  Hospital profits and user utilities are realized:
,R y c y e v e
U B y R y
ht h ht h h h h h
ut ut u ut
MOD
MOD
= - -
= -
_ _ _
_ _
i i i
i i
%
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The timing of the ex ante cost based price-cap procedure is illustrated in 
Figure 3-2 below.
time
Regulator announces
for period t 
Hospitals and users negotiate
contracts for period t 
Users choose service levels 
Hospital profits and users utilities
are realized
Actual
and allowed charges
are compared to form
Hospitals choose effort levels eht 
Rh t
CAP yh t_ i
Rh yh t_ i = Ruhu/ yuh t_ i
Rh t
CAP yh t_ i
Rh t
MOD yh t_ i
=h t% Rh tMOD yh t_ i - ch yh t,eh t_ i - vh eh t_ i
Uut = B yut_ i - Rut
MOD yut_ i
Figure - Ex ante cost-based price-cap procedure
3.5 Revenue based yardsticks
An alternative formulation of the model above that we shall investigate is 
to make a redistributive game with respect to sector revenues rather than 
costs. That is, the price caps or the associated revenue caps are 
calculated from observed revenues rather than from regulatory audited 
costs.
In its simplest possible form, the ex ante revenue based scheme, this 
means a replication of the above except that the previous revenue 
function R yht h t
CAP _ i is changed into a new revenue cap function 
G y wy
wy
R y* * ,
*
* ,
*h t
ex ante
h t
h th h
h t
h th h ht
CAP
1
1=
!
!
-
-_ _i i/ /
The only difference is therefore that we use revenues rather than costs to 
determine the general payment level. The system is similar in terms of ex 
ante commitment to the allowed revenue levels and ex post adjustments 
for mix and volume changes.
Now, it is quite clear that, except for expansions in volume, the ex ante 
based revenue system will not allow for any increases in the price-level of 
spending, irrespectively of the actual development in the cost structure. 
This is clearly not a viable approach and we shall therefore focus the 
discussion on a less naive revenue based yardstick scheme, namely one 
based on ex post revenues rather than ex ante ones.
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In the ex post revenue based scheme, present revenues and volumes are 
substituted for historical ones corresponding to a revenue cap function
G y wy
wy
R y* * ,
*
* ,
*h t
ex pos t
h t
h th h
h t
h th h ht
CAP =
!
!_ _i i/ /
In the same way as one may consider ex post revenue based systems, 
one can of course consider ex post cost based systems. In some cases, 
this may be useful, e.g. to avoid arbitrary adjustments for price changes, 
cf. Agrell and Bogetoft (2005).
In terms of the timing and the full game, it does not alter the general 
description above. The so-called ex ante and ex post systems both have 
ex ante and ex post elements. They both commit ex ante to the approach 
for determining allowed revenues ex post and they both allow for ex post 
adjustments to volume and mix. The difference is only if the payment 
level can be fixed ex ante using historical data or whether it should be 
settled ex post using the most recent data on cost or revenue levels. 
In the case of revenue based caps, it is necessary to use an ex post 
approach to get sensible results. In the case of cost based schemes, both 
an ex ante and an ex post approach may have advantages. Lastly, we 
note that with a cost based approach the difference between ex ante and 
ex post may be limited when the ex ante commitments are not for too 
long periods, i.e. with fast updating, the two systems are quite similar.
3.6 Bargaining and competition
The likely impact of the proposed regulation depends on the details of the 
Dutch context. In particular, it depends on the degree to which hospitals 
and users (insurers) can exercise market power. In the transition phase, 
for which the regulation is intended, the situation can best be charac-
terized as one of bilateral bargaining among a multiplicity of hospitals and 
users.
As a worst case scenario in terms of social welfare, we shall therefore 
investigate how the regulation would impact the bilateral bargaining 
among one representative hospital and one representative user. 
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This corresponds to the extreme outcome in Figure 3-3 below.
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Figure - Between bargaining and competition
Nash bargaining
The bargaining between hospitals and insurance companies can be 
modeled in many different ways.
An important question here is the role of asymmetric information and the 
possible losses from strategic behavior. Given the multiplicity of users and 
hospitals, the long history of collective negations on production plans and 
the detailed expenditure analyses for the risk adjust system, we do not 
believe asymmetric information to be a dominant factor. Still, we shall 
discuss some of the impacts of strategic behavior and the interaction with 
the proposed regulations in the next chapter.
In terms of formal modeling, we shall instead use a convenient and 
relatively general approach to bargaining under perfect information, 
namely generalized Nash bargaining, i.e. Nash bargaining with possibly 
non-symmetric bargaining power.
Let ch be the (relative) barging power of a hospital h and ciu=1-ch be the 
relative bargaining power of user u. Also, let the costs of hospital h be 
ch(yh) and the monetary equivalent benefits to the user of hospital h be 
bh(yh). The “gains from trade” are therefore bh(yh)-ch(yh). This benefit is 
transferable via the selected payment level Rh(yh). If there is only one 
hospital and user, the unconstrained Nash solution predicts a production 
level yh and division of net benefits using Rh that solve
b y R R c y
,Y R
h h
u
h h h
h
h h
max - -c c_ _i i7 7A A
This result has an axiomatic foundation. The classical symmetric Nash 
solution is the unique outcome that satisfy individual rationality, scale 
invariance (against affine transformations), symmetry, independence of 
irrelevant alternatives, and Pareto efficiency. It implies that the product of 
the agents’ gains from trade shall be maximized. 
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In the case of a hospital and a user having to divide a net social value of 1 
M�, this is illustrated in Figure 3-4 below.
0.5 mio
1 mio
1 mio
0.5 mio
Max = Gainh *GainU 
h
p
p
U
Figure - Unrestricted symmetric Nash bargaining
A simple consequence of the asymmetric (generalized) Nash bargaining 
solution is that if the hospital and user has to share a fixed net-surplus of 
say P, they will do so in proportion to the bargaining powers, i.e. the 
hospital will get hc %  and the user uc % .
Now, taking into account the regulation, the hospital and user cannot 
freely choose the production level and transfer Rh. They must instead 
solve the following restricted bargaining problem:
. .
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Of course, instead of assuming that one hospital only bargains with one 
insurance company, we could extend the model to account for the fact 
that hospitals will typically bargain with several hospitals. A simple way to 
do so is to assume that the bargaining is basically independent except for 
the linkage through the revenue cap. This leads to 
. .
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We shall not pursue this any further at this stage since such an approach 
ignores the fact that production costs will typically depend on the total 
production as well. In the single user model, this is implicit in the 
interpretation of the cost function. We simply use c to represent cost 
given the production level negotiated with other firms. 
Bargaining power and outside options
By using the Nash bargaining solution, we basically assume efficient 
bargaining. That is, we abstain from any explicit modeling of the 
asymmetric information and the frictions and dead weight losses this may 
give in the negotiations. This seems a reasonable simplification – but as 
indicated, we shall discuss it further below.
By varying the bargaining powers we can get reduced form 
representations of alternative settings. Thus for example, if there are 
several hospitals serving a given area, gh should fall and if there are 
several insurance companies competing for the services of the given 
hospital, gh should increase. In practice, this is at least partially 
confirmed by studies of cost mark-ups in the competitive part of the 
hospital sector, cf. Halbersma e.a.(2006).
In this way, we suggest that the details of the market conditions, the 
number of more or less substitute suppliers (hospitals) for a given user 
and the number of more or less substitute buyers (user) of a the capacity 
of a given hospital, can be roughly captured by the bargaining powers.
From a bargaining perspective, the regulation functions as an outside 
option or a credible threat to discard certain settlements. As it has been 
discussed in the literature, this can be modeled either by invoking 
alternative threat points – or by changing the bargaining set. We have 
taken the latter approach since it corresponds best to explicit modeling of 
such effects in for example a strategic bargaining model a la Rubinstein 
(1982). 
The Rubinstein (1982) approach, i.e. the writing down of some particular 
sequence of offers and replies to be made over time in the course of 
negotiations, and then looking for a non-cooperative equilibrium in the 
game thus specified, has been used in numerous studies. For a partial 
overview, see e.g. Sutton (1986). One of the issues that has been 
addressed is the role of outside options, see also Binmore, Rubinstein, 
and Wolinsky (1986). An important insight, sometimes referred to as the 
outside option principle, is that having access to outside options does not 
necessarily influence the outcome because the threat of having recourse 
to these may not be credible (i.e. not in one’s best interest when given 
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the option). If we modeled it via the threat-point, it would almost always 
influence the outcome which is not realistic – a very lax regulation will not 
influence the outcome.
The simplification from real bilateral bargaining between a multiplicity of 
players to bilateral Nash bargaining among a single user and hospital may 
also impact the solution in other ways. A user may for example have a 
total benefit function that is largely price-inelastic up to a fixed demand 
for services, but his demand from a single hospital may be at least 
somewhat elastic since by using the given hospital he also forgoes the 
option to use another hospital. This suggest that the case of inelastic 
demand is not entirely realistic in bilateral negotiations. Again, if we 
include the possibility of buying services from another hospital into the 
bargaining, this correspond to an outside option to the user, and if we 
allow this by varying the price elasticity of demand, we are once again 
modeling via the set of feasible outcomes.
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4. Analysis
4.1 Markets, bargaining and regulation 
The proposed regulation is intended to work in an environment that have 
features of both the most attractive of economic settings, that of a 
perfectly competitive market, and one of the least attractive economic 
settings, that of bilateral bargaining.
Market
In a perfectly competitive market, everyone act as price takers and there 
is no strategic behavior. Sellers and buyers alike reveal the relevant parts 
of their supply (marginal cost) and demand (marginal benefit) curves, and 
the competitive equilibrium is formed where the horizontal aggregation of 
demand and supply schedules meet. In this situation, the total gains from 
cooperation (trade) are realized. In particular, all marginal rate of 
substitution is the same for all buyers and equal the same marginal rate 
of technical transformation for the sellers.
In reality, this ideal is of course difficult to obtain in the exchange of 
numerous and complex products like DBCs. The multiplicity of products 
and the inability to freely handle all relevant information creates economic 
losses. Likewise, the possible preferences for local treatments and the 
possibilities of economies of scale and scope may hinder the ideal 
outcome and call for some sort of regulation.
Bilateral negotiations
In a bilateral trade regime, the individual users and hospitals search the 
market and negotiate price on a bilateral basis. This allows for some 
attractive arrangements, but suffers from several problems compared to 
the competitive outcome.
The first problem is a matching problem of finding the right partners and 
quantities. The direct search costs in terms of time, advertisements, etc. 
may be considerable. Likewise, the indirect search costs of for example 
ending up with a suboptimal quantity may be significant.
The second problem is that of imperfect information and strategic 
behavior. Bilateral trade has to be settled among users and hospitals with 
private information about the values and costs of services. Simple 
Bayesian bargaining models have demonstrated how sellers will overstate 
costs and buyers understate the values, often to the extent that no trade 
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is realized, even when the buyer in reality value the services above the 
costs of the sellers. As emphasized by Myerson and Satterthwaite (1983), 
delays, failures and social losses are inevitable in private bargaining when 
it is uncertain that the gains from trade can be realized. 
The third problem is that of possibly uneven bargaining power. 
Experimental studies show that bilateral trade in a market with many 
buyers and sellers tends to empower the sellers, and result in higher 
prices than the competitive prices. This result was first shown in Ketcham 
et al. (1984). Non-competitive prices will result in inefficiency and most 
likely lower supplied quantities. 
In conclusion, it is unlikely that bilateral trade will suffice to realize the full 
potential gains from reallocating the production of DBCs. Moreover, and 
just as importantly, it is likely that some parties, including the hospitals, 
may extract excessive rents.
Regulator as a market maker
The role of the regulation is to limit some of the drawback of having a 
non-competitive market for DBCs.
It is important to understand that the regulator does not in this case – as 
it is typically the case in the regulation of (local) monopolies – act as a 
proxy consumer that acquires the necessary services at a low price. 
Rather, the regulator lets the parties, hospitals and users, negotiate 
individual agreements, but he does influence the agreements that they 
can chose by putting an overall constraint on the allowed revenue to a 
hospital for given services. The regulator in this way serves as a market 
maker rather than as a proxy consumer. The role of the suggested 
regulation is to limit the possibly supernormal profits to the hospital 
sector as a whole. It hereby affects the settlements that the insurance 
companies and hospitals can choose from.
There are several effects of this as we shall now demonstrate:
The most obvious effect is to limit the hospitals’ rent extraction. The 
regulation improves the bargaining position of the users and hereby the 
benefit share that they retain. Intuitively, the regulation limits the use of 
market power that a hospital can exercise as a local monopolist by 
making it subject to implicit competition by imposing as a yardstick the 
average performance of the other hospitals.
Another and more indirect effect of the regulation is that it makes some 
production levels and product mixes more attractive than others. The 
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regulation is aiming at imposing normal profits for the hospital sector as a 
whole, not at constraining the profits of individual hospitals and one way 
to improve profits under a price cap system is to adjust the production 
level. The regulation hereby has volume, mix and allocative effects. We 
shall develop these in more details below.
It is important to understand also that within the regulation, i.e. for 
payment below the associated revenue cap function, the market 
participants are free to negotiate payment plans. There is no reason to 
restrict the choice of these plans to the one implicitly suggested by the 
regulator – in fact, there are reasons to avoid using the simple price caps 
as contracted unit prices. We shall demonstrate this as well.
4.2 Cost efficiency effects
Hospital h* will supply effort until
,
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i.e. until the marginal disutility of effort equals the marginal cost savings. 
In the slack model, we see similarly that slack and hereby costs will be 
minimized, i.e.
s=0
will be selected as long as r does not exceed 1.
From the point of view of cost minimization, the scheme works well. This 
is a simple consequence of the high-powered yardstick property – with 
fixed output, the hospital cannot affects it yardstick and any cost 
reduction is retained leading to optimal cost reduction incentives. In the 
sequel, we can therefore assume that e is set optimally, and we can 
therefore suppress it and work with costs of a hospital h* equal to 
ch*(yh*)= ch*(yh*, eh*).
4.3 Volume effects
In general, i.e. without any further assumptions about costs and benefits, 
the regulatory constraint may impact not only the profit sharing, but also 
the production level and production mix that a hospital and an insurance 
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company agrees on. We shall illustrate this in some details for the case of 
the production level and briefly discuss the mix effect next. As we will 
see, the possible distortions will be small in the likely situation of an 
almost price inelastic demand schedule. Moreover, the distortions will in 
general be dampened by the bargaining among hospitals and insurance 
companies.
The constrained barging problem from above is illustrated in the 
symmetric case in Figure 4-1 below and Figure 4-2 on the next page. In 
Figure 4-1, the unconstrained Nash bargaining leads to a choice of output 
level and payments corresponding to A that maximize the surplus and a 
division that do not collide with the regulation. In this case, the regulation 
will not impact the outcome.
yh *
ch(.)
bh (.)
yh
Rcap  h   (.)
A
Figure -1 Constrained bargaining with inactive constraint (redundant regulation)
The exact payment plan in A is not regulated. The regulation does not 
prescribe how the hospital and the insurance company should implement 
the payment and the control plan illustrated by A. Needless to say, there 
are many possibilities. They may for example decided that the insurance 
company buys a fixed capacity for a fixed price. Alternatively, they may 
decide that the insurance company pays a fixed fee plus a unit fee for all 
treatments corresponding to the marginal benefit at the production level 
in A. In Chapter 5 below, we sketch some classical contracts and discuss 
their pros and cons in a situation with uncertainty about costs and 
benefits. A more theoretical discussion is provided in Bogetoft and Olesen 
(2004).
In Figure 4-2, however, the allowed revenue is less than the 
unconstrained bargaining outcome A. The regulation would therefore 
intervene and require the excess charges to be repaid – possibly even 
with a penalty. Of course, in equilibrium this will never happen. 
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The parties know the constraints ex ante and will therefore settle for a 
production level and payment that respect the constraint. One possibility 
is to simply lower the payment to the hospital by choosing a contract 
equal to B. That is, the regulation would implicitly give the user added 
bargaining power. This however is not the only impact. If the parties 
agreed on a production level and payment like in C, where marginal costs 
equals the price cap, the profit of the hospital could increase without 
conflicting with the regulation. The user may still profit from the 
regulation – although less than in B. Depending on the relative bargaining 
power of the parties, we the outcome will therefore be between B and C. 
If the hospital has considerable bargaining power, we will be close to C 
and vise versa. This is the distortion of production level that we hinted at 
above.
yh *
ch(.)
bh(.)
yh
Rcaph(.)A
C
yh ’
B
Figure - Constrained bargaining with active constraint (regulation).
To understand the impact of the regulation, it is convenient to represent 
the bargaining set under regulation as in Figure 4-3 on the next page. 
Without regulation, the parties would settle for A corresponding to 
production level y*. This however breaks the price cap constraint. If the 
parties were still to settle for the socially optimal production level y*, it 
would lead to the point B which make the hospital considerable worse off. 
An alternative is to adjust production to the socially suboptimal level y**. 
The total benefits to be distributed here, Bh(y**)-ch(y**), is less – but the 
hospital gains a larger share in this case. The interesting feature is 
therefore that some of the inefficient outcomes (in the sense that the 
total gains from trade are not maximized) does form part of the Pareto 
efficient frontier and that the optimal solution may therefore involve 
suboptimal production levels.
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πh
π u
π h ≤ py*-c(y*)
Bh(y*) -ch (y*)
Bh(y**) -c h(y**)
A
B
C
 
Figure - Constrained bargaining.
Figure 4-4 below gives a reduced form representation of the effects of 
introducing the regulation. 
It is clear that the distortions in production levels depend on several 
factors. The concavity (elasticity) of demand, the convexity of the cost 
function, and the strength of the regulation affects the shape of the 
reduced form bargaining set. Also, the choice of solution in the bargaining 
set is affected by the bargaining powers. It is intuitively clear that 
distortions are increasing in (i) the hospitals bargaining power, and (ii) the 
power of the regulation (more high powered = lower required prices). 
In addition, we conjecture that the distortions will be more severe the 
more elastic the demand and the less convex the cost function are. 
The numerical example below illustrates this and give some idea about 
the effects of the regulation on the quantities supplied.
πh
πu
πh ≤ py*-c(y*)
A
Figure - Constrained bargaining in reduced form.
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Price inelastic demand reduces the distortions and in some cases 
eliminates them. Figure 4-5 below illustrates the possible impact. 
For some modest reductions in allowed revenue, say from the 
unconstrained A to D, there may not be any volume effects since the 
gains in profits may not outweigh the loss in user benefits. Only when 
hospital profits becomes even lower, a change in volume may result from 
the Nash bargaining. Distortions will show up as waiting lists giving 
information about excess demand. 
 
bh(.)
yh*
ch(.)
yh
Rcap 2h(.)
A
BC
yh’
D
Rcap 1h(.)
Figure - Regulation under inelastic demand.
4.4 Mix effects
Another important issue is to ensure that the hospitals provides the mix 
of treatments that maximizes social welfare. In principle this can be 
analyzed in a way parallel to the production level above, but it would 
require the introduction of an extended and somewhat cumbersome 
notation. Since the conclusions are furthermore trivial to derive given the 
insight from the analyses of the production level above, we shall abstain 
from this.
We simply conclude that with price-elastic demand, a distortions in mix is 
possible if the weights w are not equal to the marginal costs in optimum. 
With entirely inelastic demand, however, this is not necessarily the case, i.
e. the regulation will not always distort the mix in this case (Sloan and 
Steinwald, 1980).
It is worthwhile to add that the level and mix distortions are second order 
effects. In the socially optimal production plan, the marginal user benefits 
B’ equal marginal hospital costs C’. This means that the loss from 
deviating is also marginal. This is a consequence of the so-called envelop 
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theorem, cf. chapter 5 below. It says that first order deviations in the 
economic choices only have second order economic impact.
4.5 Reallocation effects
It is worthwhile to observe that the level effect may not always be to 
lower production to keep up the profit of the constrained hospital. 
The response will depend on the relationship between marginal costs MC 
at the unconstrained outcome and the price in the price cap system, i.e. 
the marginal revenue cap, MR. If MC>MR, the effect will be to lower 
production and if MC<MR, the effect will be to increase production. This is 
attractive from an allocative perspective since we hereby reallocate 
production from the more costly to the less costly hospitals much like in a 
perfect market. This is illustrated in Figure 4-6 below.
c+h(.)
bh(.)
c-h(.)
bh(.)
R
ht   
(y
ht
)CAPR
ht   
(y
ht
)CAP
h
yh* yh*y’h
Reduction of output when MC>MR
y’’h
Increase of output when MC<MR 
yh
A
B
y
A
C
D
B
 
Figure - Allocation effect
The reallocation process above may lead to overproduction in presence of 
fixed costs since MC < AC = MR due to the linear pricing scheme. Setting 
MR = MC would violate the participation constraint for the hospitals with 
fixed costs. The standard solution to this problem is to use two-part 
tariffs R’(y) = K + py, where K = C(y*) – py* for a given set of (allowed) 
prices p at production y*. For the case where the true marginal costs are 
represented by the allowed prices (MC = MR = p) the fixed term is 
positive K>0. If the prices sufficiently overestimate the marginal cost 
(MR>MC) and the demand is exogenously imposed, then the fixed term 
can be negative (K < 0) as in a franchising agreement. However, the two-
part tariff faces an important implementation problems in the actual 
setting. As one of the explicit objectives of the reform is to promote 
market entry by new operators, arrangements with K >0 would require an 
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ex ante statement on optimal scale for any hospital and some guarantee 
(the ugly princess problem) that the franchisee does not collect the fixed 
fee without performing the intended services. Under limited liability, when 
no more than the relationship specific rents can be redistributed, there 
would no equilibrium in the market structure as the entry/exit incentives 
are skewed towards hit-and-run. Moreover, as the model is based on the 
assumption that the aggregate demand for any user (read: insurer) is 
bounded, the distortion effects due to output expansion are also bounded 
upwards. Nevertheless, the implementation problem for two-part tariffs 
does pose a danger for supply-induced demand that must be countered 
by other measures, e.g. safeguards of the vertical separation between 
primary diagnosis givers and health care providers as well as some 
aggregate analyses on the development of overall expenditure. 
4.6 Demand inducement and moral hazard
Given the previously mentioned local volume and mix distortions, an 
important question is to what extent the global demand facing the 
hospital sector is exogenous from the regulation scheme as well as the 
incentives and market environment that physicians and patients face.
When hospitals and physicians face a high-powered incentive scheme 
(such as a fee-for-service regulation), demand inducement is widely 
thought to be a prevalent phenomenon. Various theories have been 
proposed, such as the target income hypothesis, income effects (inspired 
by the labor economics literature) and revenue targeting from a 
participation constraint. 
The empirical health economics literature (McGuire, 2000), however, 
shows mixed results about the magnitude of demand inducement. There 
is a large volume of research that could support demand inducement, but 
which do not discriminate between the inducement hypothesis and 
theories with fixed patient preferences. Moreover, most studies are about 
the marginal effects on demand following income effects on the supply-
side. The inconclusive effect on the magnitude of marginal demand 
inducement therefore does not rule out infra-marginal demand 
inducement. The no-effect finding in the literature therefore does not rule 
out the existence of demand inducement. In summary, whatever the 
current level of demand inducement, the literature is not supportive of 
large marginal demand inducement following changes in incentives, such 
as those imposed by the regulatory system described in this paper.
Yardstick competition for multi-product hospitals

The effects of patient incentives on demands are much clearer (Zweifel 
and Manning, 2000). The Rand Health Insurance Experiment (Newhouse 
et al., 1993) showed that health care demand is responsive to cost-
sharing arrangements across a broad range of health care. The 
experiment also showed no significant or appreciable differences on 
measures of health status (including self-reported health, physical health 
and mental health) for participants with different health care 
consumption. 
4.7 Convergence
An important question regarding the regime is naturally whether the 
dynamic game between insurers and hospitals, freely establishing 
contracts and prices for services, will converge to a stable and unique 
equilibrium. 
Beginning with a competitive setting on a perfect market, denote by z(p) 
the vector of excess demand at a price system p at any given time. Varian 
(1992) states that any price system p defined over a set of product 
converges in a finite steps to an equilibrium p* if the adjustment rule is 
defined as 
 
pd=zd(p)       6d
and the excess demand function holds the weak axiom of revealed 
preference, i.e.
p*z(p) > 0 for all p!p*
Departing from the global stability theorem, one may investigate if all of 
the assumptions are satisfied for the proposed regime.
First, the existence of an excess demand function is based on an axiom 
with insatiable and monotonous utility (demand) functions. In the case of 
the health care demand, this is normally approximated with the 
observation of waiting lists/times for specific services. Although trivially 
true (the waiting lists would disappear if there was a bidding of each 
treatment slot), there are a number of complications with the analogy. the 
existence of a waiting list is already an instrument to manage demand by 
the provider, not the market maker. Thus, the excess demand may be 
imperfectly observed and recorded. 
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Second, the tatonnement process of gradual adjustments presumes that 
the value of excess demand pz(p) represents an incentive to provide 
additional services or adjust prices. However, under regulation this is not 
necessarily true. Under price regulation, the convergence obviously is left 
to the regulator, often in absence of a reliable excess demand function as 
of above. Under revenue regulation, the regulated enterprise has the right 
to earn R = py(p) and could theoretically adjust the prices until it fully 
exploits the demand curve, either to maximize net profit as a constrained 
monopolist, or minimize effort in the case profit is extracted. 
Although the two invoked assumptions are not fulfilled, the yardstick 
regime has additional features that warrant for faster convergence. On 
the one hand the revenue regulation is not regulating the prices or 
conditions between insurers and hospitals. I.e., a hospital cannot apply 
the monopolist logic referred to above, as there may be other hospitals 
underbidding it on a set of services. On the other hand, waiting lists, z(p) 
> 0, are here signals of inefficient pricing that indeed could be addressed 
by adjusting prices. In addition to firm-level incentives to manage the 
price adjustment process, such as an improved utilization of resources 
and higher marginal revenue per service, there is also a second dimension 
to the problem: the regulator and the weight adjustment process. It 
follows from the convergence conditions that the regulator should take 
into account sector-wide wide proxies for excess demand (waiting lists, 
artificially long treatment times, etc) in the revision of the DBC weights as 
to facilitate the capacity adjustment process and the incentive value of 
the weights.
 
4.8 Robustness to diverse firm preferences
We have so far assumed that the hospitals are profit maximizers. We note 
however, that this is not necessary for most of the properties derived 
above. What is important is
— Do they seek to maximize the charges they make Rh ?
— Do they seek to minimize costs?
— Do they weigh cost reductions and revenue increases equally?
The maximization of charges hold quite generally. A hospital driven by 
other motives, like slack maximization, effort minimization, maximization 
of resource to be spend on non-verifiable quality etc will – like a profit 
maximizing firm - seek to get the highest possible payment for its given 
services. 
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It is of course possible to have hospitals that not seek to maximize the 
charges. Cooperatives are the obvious theoretical exception to the charge 
maximizing behavior. A cooperative owned by the clients should in 
principle minimize its charges. In reality, however, they may nevertheless 
charge much the same – by simply substituting slack or excessive costs 
for compensations to its investors. For many types of hospitals, we 
therefore suggest that it is reasonable to assume that the bargaining 
between the hospitals and the insurance companies as well as the disciple 
hereon from the price cap will be analogous to the case of profit 
maximizing firms.
A desire to minimize costs is also reasonable to assume in many case. 
Profit maximizing firms are the prime example, but a user owned 
cooperative should in principle behave similarly on the cost side. 
In summary, we suggest that hospitals in general, and not only profit 
maximizing hospitals, will try to increase charges and to lower its costs of 
given procedures. This is the crucial behavioral characteristics focused at 
above.
The last behavioral characteristic, assigning equal importance to 
increases in revenue and decreases in costs, is important for the levels of 
production chosen and for the speed by which adjustments towards a 
competitive outcome is attained. We suggest that these effects are 
second order effects compared to the main properties of the system. 
This is also the behavioral characteristic that is hardest to justify across 
ownership types etc. A non-for-profit organization may not want to 
restrain production to a level, where profit is maximized. Likewise, a 
cooperative may end up overproducing or under producing depending on 
the details of the situation, cf. e.g. Bogetoft and Olesen (2006).
Finally, as long as all firms are perfectly profit maximizing with an 
identical cost function, an ex ante cost-based revenue cap with ex post 
volume adjustment is functionally equivalent to the ex post DBC-adjusted 
revenue yardstick. If, however, the set of firms contains firms with other 
objectives, such as revenue maximization or maximum capacity 
utilization, their pricing decisions may not correspond to those of a 
rational profit maximizer. In particular, the fact that most hospitals 
currently are non-for-profit is likely to have an impact on their way of 
pricing actual and future services. The revenue logic is then super-
imposing the objectives of the least (current) cost provider upon the 
sector, although this may not necessarily be the long-term least cost 
policy. Moreover, without knowing the cost structure, it can also be 
difficult to identify which agents are profit-maximizing and which are not 
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in order to possibly correct the revenues. As will be discussed below on 
innovation incentives, the lowest current revenue may not be enough to 
guarantee sufficient process development in the future.
4.9 Robustness to heterogeneous cost functions
Although the model assumes an identical sector cost function, the scheme 
does not deploy an information revelation mechanism that crucially 
depends on this assumption. In particular, one may extend the scenario 
to local cost functions Ch(.) that depend on local factor prices and varying 
fixed costs related to the assets (e.g. buildings). If the factor prices follow 
some regularity with respect to the input basket, the regime could be 
implemented with price indexes Kh to represent local cost differences (e.
g. related to exogenous data on salary costs, land prices, etc). An 
alternative would be to estimate perform an stochastic production 
function estimation and to regress the detected cost inefficiency on some 
indicators or location, environment and market. The latter approach 
cannot be directly used in the regime, as it is only partially capable of 
detecting the direction of the causality involved (high cost areas or 
pockets of inefficiency). However, it could be instrumental to detect the 
relevance of, and plausible factors for, local cost function correction. 
 
4.10 Information requirements
The advantage with a revenue-based yardstick mechanism compared to a 
cost-based lies in the lower information requirements, since the regime 
does not need to determine costs for the activity. In a competitive 
market, the final price, not the accounting operating cost, is the pivotal 
signaling device towards clients. Thus, firms may choose different ways of 
internalizing investments, innovations, managerial incentives and financial 
structure that manifest themselves as different accounting costs, 
although the user value, i.e. the price, may be the same. 
However, the autonomy of the revenue-based scheme from cost-level 
data is not as perfect in a practical implementation. This is due to 
primarily three problems: the price adjustment mechanism, the diversity 
in firm-level objectives and capital valuation. 
First, a revenue-based yardstick can be implemented using either fixed 
(or only downwardly revisable) or free service prices. 
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In the first case, the viability of the system relies on the absence of 
systematic cost shocks (that would violate the IR conditions, i.e. non-
negative expected profit) and/or a frequently applied updating system 
(which will reintroduce the cost aspect). 
In the latter case, the prices of last period are used in the updating. If 
now there is no penalty for exceeding the revenue cap, the pricing 
adjustment does not converge for a situation of inelastic demand since 
there is no incentive to decrease prices. In the case of sufficiently large 
repayment penalty (cf. Agrell and Bogetoft, 2005), there exists an 
equilibrium such that the prices adjust to the same level as for an 
equivalent cost-based yardstick. The management of the penalties must 
be careful as both too low and too high values will give rise to distortions. 
Moreover, the price adjustment mechanism of the revenue-based 
yardstick is more sensitive to collusion than the cost-based yardstick. In 
the revenue-based system, the historical price level and the relative DBC 
weights act as focal points in the price stetting game. Given this focal 
point, individual hospitals have no incentive to deviate their pricing 
behavior (though they might adjust their costs, this has no consequences 
for the update the yardstick). For the cost-based yardstick, the analogous 
focal point is unstable against individual costs adjustments (for which 
there is ample incentive). 
Second, the previously discussed existence of heterogeneous firm-level 
objectives, including distorted capital costs from weak political principals, 
could jeopardize the sustainability of the ex post revenue-based yardstick 
under mixed ownership in the sector. Since distorted capital may be 
scarce and the principals unwilling to expand to cover the shortfall in 
capacity due to exiting firms with full capital costs, the excess demand 
signal may be insufficient to reach a feasible coverage. To counter this 
effect, the regulator may monitor the revenues or the financial structure 
of the firms as to detect non-competitive behavior, in essence a return to 
a heavier information system requirement.  
Third, the institutional settings may differ in terms of capital valuation 
and financing. Assuming a budget/cost-based pricing scheme, the 
incumbent capital valuation will have a direct influence on the revenues. 
However, it is well known in regulation that accounting-based capital 
measures suffer from serious drawbacks for pricing related to their 
temporal and fiscal limitations. Historic acquisition values may be a poor 
prediction of future capital intensity in an activity, also for reinvestments 
and/or associated staff costs. The capital cost may also be influenced with 
elements from the prior point, e.g. institutional and ownership 
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involvement. A hospital that is integrated in a larger structure of publicly 
owned enterprises may enjoy artificially low capital costs due to passive 
owners and low risk rating due to soft budget constraints at group level. 
4.11 Discussion
In summary, the yardstick principle assumes a homogenous task 
description, a standardized cost definition and homogenous firm 
objectives. The revenue oriented yardstick mechanism is an alternative 
for sectors with long tradition of private and dispersed ownership, where 
the competitive behavior is well established. In a setting like the 
incumbent Dutch situation, the avoidance of cost estimation might 
jeopardize the fundaments of the regime, i.e. the feasibility of continued 
operation at the given level of reimbursement for a privately owned 
market-oriented operator.
The regime is analogous to similar approaches used in regulation of 
complex multi-product services with high societal importance, e.g. the 
ECOM+ model utilized by Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway and 
Portugal in the regulation of transmission system operators (cf. Agrell and 
Bogetoft, 2004). Both models use a detailed output space to capture the 
diversified services of the providers and simplifying assumptions such as 
constant relative prices and constant returns to scale in order to arrive at 
a scalar efficiency norm. Experience shows that the ECOM+ norm due to 
the rich output description is robust to errors in the weights of individual 
services and to technical assumptions related to e.g. life times of assets 
(cf. Agrell and Bogetoft, 2006). An interesting empirical finding is also 
that the operators under regulation with ex ante relative output prices 
have shown interest to reveal private information with respect to output 
valuation in order to obtain relative advantages. This reduces the 
information acquisition burden of the regulator and contributes under 
some mild assumptions on the information structure to faster 
convergence in the price space.  
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5. Quality and innovation incentives
In the main analysis, we have focused on the proposed mechanism as 
presented in preliminary documents. However, as the contractual and 
institutional framework is likely to evolve in parallel with the economic 
reform process, we also present some comments on alternative contract 
forms between clients, insurers and hospitals with respect to a 
particularly central issue: the incentives for innovation and quality 
provision. We begin with the most straight-forward issue related to 
innovations in cost-reductions and service enhancements, later to 
proceed to a more in-depth discussion of quality provision and its 
regulation.
5.1 Incentives for innovation
In a dynamic setting over several periods, the incentives for innovation 
become important for the welfare effects of the mechanism. To the extent 
an optimal rate of innovation and research are promoted (demoted) by 
the regulation, the welfare effects will be positive (negative). Not to 
complicate the presentation with a full dynamic model, we will limit the 
discussion here to the qualitative findings regarding information 
generation. Initially, we will distinguish two dimensions of analysis and 
then proceed to look at them systematically.
First, only innovations related to process or service improvements can be 
taken into account in the analysis. Their effect over some horizon is to 
either lower the cost of a given set of services, or to extend the set of 
eligible services. 
Second, the main characteristics of information economics related to 
innovation is whether the information is generated as a common goods 
property or not. In our context, this would correspond to the capacity of 
the agents to protect the generated processes and services from 
competing agents. In a competitive setting, the common goods property 
would induce underinvestment in research, as the benefits cannot be fully 
internalized by the agents. However, in a non-competitive setting (such as 
regulation), offering extended property rights to information may actually 
lower welfare if markets for information are imperfect and firms are 
prohibited to extend their services. 
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Cost-reducing innovations
Assume that a hospital may undertake an investment I in research that is 
expected to lower the annual costs for bundle y from C(y) to C’(y). 
Irrespective of revenue cap R(y), the decision to undertake or not the 
investment is then purely based on the rule 
I C y C y
1
1
d
d- -^ ^_ h h i
where d is an annuity factor to represent the value of time. (The specific 
risk related to R&D, i.e. the probability of failure or no effects is here 
incorporated in the cost effects). Next, assume that the sector will be 
learn about and be entitled to use the information from year N. Under 
yardstick regulation, this actually induces endogeneity into the 
mechanism, since the firm will have to take into account the effects on 
the revenue side by their disclosed information before undertaking the 
investment. Assume that the expected costs for the other agents will 
decrease from Ch(y) to Ch’ from year N. Ceteris paribus, the investment 
rule is now: 
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where the second term lowers the threshold for the investment value, i.e., 
increases the required payoff during the proprietary period of investment. 
If the information has common goods properties, i.e., the innovation is 
instantly perfectly observable and costlessly imitable by the other agents 
(N=1), then there is no incentive to undertake innovation, as the gains are 
washed out in the first period. Adding a cost for adoption of rival 
innovations changes the conclusions only if it is higher than the 
investment cost for the investment, net of any protected period earnings. 
The yardstick logic mimics the competitive markets with respect to cost-
reducing innovations: their frequency depends on the period for 
harvesting the benefits and the ease by which existing innovations can be 
copied. In the hospital setting in the Netherlands, where the managerial 
focus so far has been less cost-driven, one might expect positive initial 
incentives for innovation in a redistributive setting. Hospitals that are 
actively pursuing both process innovation and process learning (e.g. 
copying in our context) are likely to achieve temporal gains, i.e. a 
proportional higher share of the sector revenues.
Under a low-powered regulation regime, there is no incentive to 
undertake cost-reducing investments. Although C(y) is refinanced by the 
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users, the investment I may be subject to either equity financing or 
capital rationing, which naturally causes a distortion towards maintaining 
the expenditure. If the investment I is interpreted as the effort 
(coordination etc) involved in information acquisition activities related to 
learning, we see also that the incumbent regime does not provide any 
incentives to refrain from internal activities and to engage in learning best 
practice.
Service innovations
The second class of innovations aims at product/service differentiation, by 
which the product space is extended. As opposed to the earlier scenario 
with respect to cost-reducing innovations, the regulatory weights w will 
have an impact on the incentives in this case. The innovation decision is 
here driven by the revenue side, viz. the output characterization. Assume 
that a firm can undertake an investment I in R&D as to achieve an 
expected differentiation in output from y to (y’, y’’), with cost C(y) and 
C(y’, y’’) respectively. The decision rule for investment in isolation is 
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where the new weights are denoted (w’,w’’) after innovation. Analogous to 
the previous case, the time of exclusivity (barriers for imitation) will have 
an effect on the investment threshold. The longer time (higher barriers), 
the lower requirements put at the regulator to reward the investment 
through the weights. Note that the incentives here are primarily redistri-
butive: the innovating firm hops to get a higher share of the sector’s cost 
by extending the output vector before the competing firms. However, the 
analysis also requires item-line rents, i.e., the any possible substitution 
between existing services y’ and the new services y’’ must be offset by 
the increase in value-added: w’y’ + w’’y’’ – wy – C(y’,y’’) + C(y). 
The conclusions in this respect reveal differences from competitive 
markets as firms are constrained in their overall revenues. Rather than 
collectively expanding the output space, the service-innovating firms in 
healthcare are acting preemptively to safeguard their share of the cake. 
As research and development not only are costly, but also risky, the 
weights should take into consideration the necessary premium for 
innovation, given the specific barriers of imitation for the service. If the 
weight is set based on the cost for realized investments, the costs for 
(invisible) failed investments will not be recovered, which lowers the 
incentives below the competitive (unconstrained) level. 
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For comparison, contrast the yardstick regime with the incentives for 
service innovations under a low-powered regime. As long as capital is 
rationed or subject to equity financing, the innovation in new services is 
disincentivized by the cost-recovery regime since it may lead to lower 
costs and/or higher private costs for the same potential output. Clearly, 
the cost-plus regulation makes the individual agent independent of 
possible learning by other agents and the subsequent impact on sector 
costs. The incentives for the service innovation process are skewed 
towards introduction of new services that either are more expensive 
(more advanced) than previous products or that are complements (output 
expansion). Development of new cost-efficient substitute treatments are 
directly demoted. We note that the new service incentives under low-
powered regimes are far from those of competitive markets and that 
there are risks of “overtreatment” rather than the opposite.  
5.2 Quality provision incentives
Quality has traditionally been handled through the imposition of a system 
of compulsory and a system of suggestive minimum standards. Coupled 
with a tendency to rely on medical reasoning, this has lead to very high 
quality standards in Western Europe. This, however, may neither be 
optimal nor the long run competitive equilibrium. First, the cost of 
ensuring the present high quality level may exceed the benefits and the 
present quality level, although certainly high enough, may actually be too 
high and too costly. Second, any change in the regulatory approach will 
change the behavior of the agents. In particular, a movement towards a 
more high powered arms-length incentive regulation will induce the 
hospital to focus more on cost minimization with a possible adverse effect 
on quality.
Optimal quality level
The basic underlying problem is to determine the optimal trade-off 
between the costs of producing higher quality and the benefits derived 
from it. This problem is illustrated in Figure 5-1 on the next page. Here 
the cost function is the cost to the firm of changing its present quality 
level. The benefit function B(q) is similarly the gains to the consumers 
from changes in the quality level.
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Euro
Quality
LevelOptimaloptq
Max
C(q) = cost to firm
B(q = benefit to
consumers
 
Figure -1 Optimal quality level
The optimal level leads to the largest difference between costs and 
benefits (i.e. marginal benefits equal to marginal costs).
Information and Strategic Behavior
In reality, the regulator knows neither costs nor benefits a priori. He must 
therefore try to reveal information about these aspects from the firms 
and the customers. This raises the problem of asymmetric information 
and strategic behavior since the firms may want to exaggerate costs to 
get a higher compensation and the customers may want to underplay 
their true values to pay less. Faced with these problems, the regulator 
should not strive for so-called first-best solutions as illustrated above. 
Rather, he must settle with second best solutions or – if he takes into 
account broader systems costs like administrative costs - third best 
solutions. 
In an incumbent low-powered regime, the hospital has incentives to 
increase the cost of quality above the socially optimal level C(qopt). 
As this is valid in aggregate too, the provider has greater incentives to 
increase the cost for relatively more expensive treatments, irrespective of 
the possible decreasing returns in welfare. Since the situation has no 
equilibrium under soft budget constraints, the regulator must then impose 
ad hoc budgets to the hospitals to allocate over a set of services and 
quality levels. A full modeling of the behavior of the firm under the low-
powered regulation is beyond the scope of this paper, but it suffices to 
hypothesize  that the firm in a one-period game would select an allocation 
policy that would minimize effort while making the budget constraint 
binding. In a two-period model with possible revisions upwards for 
detected shortages, one can also show how hospitals can allocate their 
budgets as to achieve too high quality levels for subsets of the output 
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space while rationing in areas that are likely to increase the probability for 
further increases in funding. Hence, although quality as such is promoted 
under low-powered regimes, the net effects on social welfare are 
ambiguous, even when only considering the output mix and quality level 
decisions.
Collective or individual qualities
From a regulatory point of view, a crucial question is if it is possible and / 
or desirable to have different quality levels across insurers and hospitals. 
This leads to the distinction between:
— Collective regimes 
— Individual regimes
In the collective regime, all customers enjoy the same quality level – or at 
lest the same minimal level. The regulator works as a proxy customer and 
he imposes quality standards with respect to all insurers as well.
In the individual regime, the regulator allows the insurers to demand and 
the hospitals to supply different qualities to different customer groups. 
The terms may be settled through bilateral negotiations among the firms 
and the insurers. In a secondary market, the insurers may then promote 
their conditions through differentiated enrollment fees. 
Whether to regulate a given quality dimension in an individual or a 
collective scheme depends on technical aspects, economic implications as 
well regulatory preferences.
Based on fairness criteria etc, the regulator may prefer the universal 
provision of quality even though it may be possible to provide different 
quality levels to different users.
From the point of designing quality regulation, an important first step is 
to choose which aspects of quality should be governed by a collective or 
an individual regime. To do so in a systematical way, it may be useful to 
establish even a rough evaluation of the cost of differentiated quality and 
the preferences for such differentiation. While the former depends on 
primarily technical aspects the latter depends on both the possible 
differences in the consumers demand functions and the general prefe-
rences of the regulator. Table 5-1 on the next page illustrates parts of 
such an evaluation.
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Table -1 Evaluation of quality dimensions wrt cost, value and mode
Quality 
dimension
Cost of individual 
regime
Value of individual 
regime
Choice of 
regime
Mortality Prohibitively high Some Collective
Case information Limited Some Individual
Figure 5-2 below illustrates an instance where there are significant 
differences in the demand for quality from different consumer groups and 
where it may therefore be worthwhile to introduce such variations 
depending of course on the costs.
Qualityqhighqlow
Max
Max
B2
B1
C
Figure - Different quality to different consumers
All of what has been said above can – with obvious modifications – be 
repeated in an inquiry as to the desirability of allowing differentiated 
quality levels from different hospitals. An instance suggesting high social 
benefits of differentiation provided the regulator does not have a strong 
desire for fairness or equality at all costs, is illustrated in Figure 5-3 on 
the next page.
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Figure - Different qualities at different firms
Equality Concepts
A common objective among stakeholders seems to be that different 
consumers should be treated equally and fairly. This is also related to the 
universal service obligations. Unfortunately, it is not clear what fairness 
means.
To illustrate the problems, we note that an equal treatment of different 
consumers may mean at least three different things:
— All are given the same services for the same price
—  All have the same possibilities to choose among different service-price 
combinations
— All get the same improvements
To understand the differences a restaurant analogy may be helpful. The 
first interpretation corresponds to the restaurant quests being served the 
same meal and paying the same price. The second fairness notion refers 
to a situation where all customers are handed the same menu. The third 
situation could refer to a situation with income differentiated prices and 
products.
It is beyond the scope of this report to define exactly what fairness 
means. We do suggest however that an important question in the design 
of a regulatory scheme, including the regulation of quality and the fee 
structure, is to analyze and agree on some more precise notions of 
fairness.
Bundled or Separated Regulation
Another important general question in the design of a regulatory 
framework for quality is the extent to which the regulator should 
implement different dimensions jointly as a package deal or separately as 
a series of individual regulation problems. Given the information problem 
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and the likely strategic behavior of firms and consumes, the joint 
implementation has advantages. By bundling the dimensions, the parties 
can be induced more easily to reveal the underlying costs and benefits, cf. 
e.g. Antle, Bogetoft and Stark(1999).
Comprehensive or Partial Regulation
A principal question facing the regulator is whether to integrate the 
quality dimension into the price regulation framework to form a 
comprehensive model of the costs of providing different levels of different 
qualities of output. Theoretically, this would be the ideal solution but 
practically, this may lead to dimensionality problems in the estimation of 
the resulting complex and detailed benchmark model. 
A more realistic approach is probably to think of the price regulation as 
being conditioned on certain minimal standards and than to allow the 
regulation of quality to be undertaken via one or more partial add-on 
models of the cost increases (decreases) that will be allowed for certain 
increases (decreases) in quality. This is the approach we shall discuss 
here. What is forgone by this approach is the possible interaction of 
quality and quantity and the possible gains from bundling quality and 
quantity signals.
Implementation
Given a reasonable amount of information about costs and benefits, the 
(near) optimal quality level can be determined. The natural next question 
is how the regulator can steer the firms (or consumers) to choose these 
levels. There are several such ways and in this chapter we outline some 
important ones and discuss their pros and cons in the context of 
uncertainty and asymmetric information. The methods can be used in an 
individual as well as in a collective scheme. We emphasize the steering of 
the firms but we note also, as we shall return to, that similar steering of 
the customers is possible via demand management schemes. 
5.3 Steering mechanisms 
We shall now outline four principal ways in which the hospital may be 
incentivized to adjust quality towards the socially optimal level, the qopt 
in Figure 5-1.
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One possibility is to use a generalized price plan where the firm is 
reimbursed an amount R(q) equal to the consumers benefit B(q) minus a 
lump sum (quality independent) payment A:
R(q) = -A + B(q)
The lump sum amount A can be chosen as any value between 0 and 
B(qopt)-C(qopt). High values means that all the gains from adoption to 
optimal quality goes to the consumers and low values means that the 
gains go the firm. This scheme is illustrated in Figure 5-4 below. 
Qualityq opt
R(q)
Figure - Generalized price plan
The generalized scheme is advantageous by leading to optimal quality 
levels for all possible cost functions. The regulator do not need to know 
and constantly track changes in the costs function except to determine 
the exact range in which A can be chosen. On the other hand, the 
regulator needs considerable information about the benefit function. To 
collect such information, the regulator may undertake willingness to pay 
and consumer choice studies where a number of consumers are asked 
how much they are willing to pay for improved quality and how they would 
choose in some hypothetical choice experiments. There is a considerable 
literature on the design of such studies and a large body of practical 
experience, in part from the marketing science. Still, the collection of 
information about B(.) may be a non-trivial task. Moreover, it may be 
difficult to communicate especially in the multiple dimensional case.
A second possibility is to use a so-called two-price scheme where the firm 
is paying a lump sum amount A for the right to make quality decisions 
plus a relative high price for quality improvements, when quality is low, 
and a small price for quality improvements when quality is higher:
R(q) = -A +p1q –p2max{q-q
opt,0}
0
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This scheme is illustrated in Figure 5-5 below.
 
qopt Quality
R(q)
Figure - Two-price plan
The advantage of this scheme is its relative simplicity making it easy to 
communicate and to adapt to. Also, the outcome is less sensitive to 
changes in costs and benefits than the restriction based approach.
A third possibility is to use a so-called marginal-price scheme where the 
firm is paid a lump sum amount A plus a relative small price for quality 
improvements equal to the marginal value to the consumers in optimum:
R(q) = A +pq
This scheme is illustrated in Figure 5-6 below.
Qualityq opt
R(q)
 
Figure - Marginal price scheme
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The advantage of this scheme is its relative simplicity making it easy to 
communicate and to adapt to. Also, the outcome is not too sensitive to 
changes in costs and benefits. On the other hand, the estimation of 
marginal value in optimum must be rather precise.
The final possibility we will consider here is to use a restriction based plan 
similar to the familiar minimal quality requirement approach in health 
care provision. In this scheme, the reimbursement to the firm equals A if 
it comply with minimal standards and the penalty otherwise is very large
R(q) = A if q>=0 and very negative otherwise
Again, the lump sum amount A can be chosen as any value between 0 and 
B(qopt)-C(qopt). High values mean that all the gains from adoption to 
optimal quality go to the firm and low values that the gains go the 
consumers. This scheme is illustrated in Figure 5-7 below.
q opt =Min Quality
R(q)
 
Figure - Restriction based scheme
The advantage of this scheme is its simplicity making it easy to 
communicate and to adapt to. On the other hand, its optimality is 
extremely sensitive to variations in the cost and benefits function. It is 
therefore primarily useful in those cases, where the benefit or cost curves 
are linked with a sharp decrease in marginal value or a sharp increase in 
marginal costs at qopt.
All the schemes sketched above involved some lump sum payment, 
denoted A. The size of this payment depends both on the way the non-
quality revenue model is calibrated and on the way the gains from quality 
adjustments shall be distributed between the hospitals, the insurers and 
the consumers. By and large, however, the incentive effects are not 
dependent on A and we shall therefore leave the problem of setting A for 
future more detailed studies. 
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To illustrate the idea here, it suffices to note that if, for example, we 
assume that the reimbursement for the non-quality dimensions presumes 
a given minimal quality level, the quality payment schemes shall ideally 
be interpreted as penalty or bonuses for deviations from these minimum 
levels. This means that A shall be chosen such that the quality payments 
are 0 at the minimal levels. 
Robustness to changes in costs and benefits
All the schemes above require information about benefits and –except for 
the generalized payment plan – costs. Since such information is noisy at 
best, it is important in the choice of regime to consider the impact of 
having misspecified costs and benefits – or to have changes in costs and 
benefits over time. We have already indicated that he generalized scheme 
is the most robust to changes in cost structure and the restriction based 
among the least robust schemes in this respect. Two general economic 
results may shed further light over this question.
The first, sometimes known as the envelope theorem, suggests that first 
order deviations in the estimation of economic choices may only have a 
second order economic impact. In the present case, let
N(q) = B(q) - C(q)
denote the net benefit and let us assume that we have estimated the 
optimal q to q* rather than qopt. Assuming differentiability and making a 
so-called Taylor approximation of N(q) we get
N(q*)=N(qopt)+N’(qopt)(q*-qopt)+0.5N’’(q)(q*-qopt)
for some q between q* and qopt. Since N’(qopt)=0, we see that the 
difference between N(q*) and N(qopt) will not be too large unless the net-
benefit function is strongly curved. See also Akerlof and Yellen (1985).
The second set of results concern the relative merits of the marginal price 
and the restriction based methods. Varying the benefit function has the 
same impact in all regimes since the signal send to the firm and therefore 
its behavior is fixed. Quality adaptations to changes in the cost function, 
however, are severely affected by the regimes. In the generalized regime, 
optimal adaptation is obtained – at least as long as the lump-sum 
payment is set to 0. The two price system works reasonably as well, 
although of course not as well as the generalized scheme. To choose 
among the price and restriction based approaches, we need to consider 
the elasticity of supply and demand. When the demand is rather elastic, 
i.e. the marginal benefit curve is relatively flat compared to the supply 
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curve, i.e. marginal cost curve, price regulation leads to the smallest 
losses. This is intuitively natural since in this case it is of particular 
importance to take into account the costs. Figure 5-8 illustrates this.
Euro
Expected marginal cost
Actual marginal cost
Loss from 
price control
Loss from 
restriction control
Marginal social benefit
Qualityq*
p*
 
Figure - High elasticity of demand.
Similarly, when the demand is rather in-elastic, i.e. the marginal benefit 
curve is relatively steep compared to the supply curve, the adaptation to 
costs should play a smaller role and therefore minimal standards are 
superior. Figure 5-9 below illustrates this case.
Euro
Expected marginal cost
Actual marginal cost
Loss from 
price control Loss from 
restriction control
Quality
Marginal social benefit
p*
q*
Figure - Low elasticity of demand control
Decision rights to the best informed
Traditionally, quality decisions are delegated to the hospitals and indeed 
this is the perspective we have used in the discussion of implementation 
above. This is particularly relevant when we consider common regimes 

Nederlandse ZorgautoriteitYardstick competition for multi-product hospitals

where all users are going to enjoy the same quality level. For other 
quality attributes however it is possible to let the users decide. The four 
implementation mechanisms above can conceptually be turned around to 
cover user based implementations. In such cases, the regulator should 
set up payment schemes or price plans stating what the consumers 
should pay for different level of required quality. Even the restriction 
based method can be used in this case. It would be a maximal allowed 
quality requirement below which the consumers can choose.
A key question in the allocation of decision rights is who has the best 
information. If the costs are relatively stable and foreseeable but the 
benefit structure is hard to elicit, the consumers should be allocated the 
decision rights and they should pay a lump sum for this right. If on the 
other hand benefits are relatively well described but costs are 
complicated and likely to vary over time, the firm based regime is 
preferable. 
5.4 Summary on R&D and quality
The incentives for research and development activities under the 
proposed regime are different with respect to the objective of the 
innovation. For cost-reducing innovations, the regime is a robust pseudo-
competitive instrument that provides both carrots (frontier-shift) and 
sticks (catch-up) for firm-level R&D. In this regard, it is the high-powered 
quality of the regime that provides the correct incentives, which are likely 
to provide positive behavioral signals to the decision makers. For the 
service or quality innovations, the conclusions depend on the exact 
updating procedure applied for new services and the policy adopted for 
potentially protecting proprietary methods. As innovation inherently is 
risky, a retrospective output-valuation based on actual costs in 
combination with an absence of information property rights is likely only 
to promote imitation (adoption) and to demote innovation. Adequate risk 
premiums in the weight settings, potentially limited in time, could 
mitigate this effect.  
Quality provision incentives can be modulated in several ways, each of 
which pose specific requirements on the contractual partners involved: 
the hospitals, the insurers and the clients.
In theory, it would be ideal to integrate the quality and quantity regulation 
into a comprehensive regulation. However, the complexities involved 
related to information access on client status and treatment outcome are 
likely to be prohibitive. Thus, a separated regime could be more effective 
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as long as it provides a credible threat to penalize quality deviations 
either through direct adjustments of the revenue cap or through 
reclassifications of the services rendered. 
In healthcare provision, one can also argue that an ex post yardstick 
regime is superior to an ex ante regime. Treatment outcomes and 
procedures are observable ex post and this information can be used to 
incentivize current behavior. We therefore believe that the current 
proposal stands well with respect to quality regulation. 
Lastly, considering the specific choice of contractual form, we have 
sketched four possible schemes above, viz. the generalized price plan, the 
two-price plan, the marginal price plan and the restriction based plan. In 
a world of perfect information, it really does not matter which of the 
approaches one chooses. In a world of uncertainty and asymmetric 
information about production costs, however, the simple marginal cost 
scheme seems to have particular attractive properties. The incentives are 
not too dependent on precise and reliable information about both costs 
and benefits. Moreover, it leaves the adjustments to the insurer-hospital 
negotiation that is presumably better informed about the costs of quality. 
Lastly it is simple and easy to communicate.
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6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have provided a formalized description and analysis of 
the proposed yardstick regulation for Dutch hospitals. The model clarifies 
how the regulation is envisaged to work – and how this interacts with the 
objectives of users, insurance companies, hospitals and the regulator.
The overall findings on the investigated properties are summarized in 
Table 6-1 on the next page. The main advantages, the clear cost 
reduction incentives as well as the incentives to undertake cost reduction 
innovations, are common for the two alternative formulations, being 
consequences of the high-powered character of the regulation. However, 
the transfer of rents from hospitals to users and limitation of the 
bargaining power of the hospital sector which is important in the 
transition period, are more clearly identified for the cost-based regime. 
The revenue-based yardstick leads to multiple equilibria for the rent 
sharing with the efficiency depending on whether past prices are focal 
points and the responsiveness of the pricing management to changes in 
the cost structure. 
We have identified also some potential drawbacks of the systems. Most 
importantly, the system may in theory distort production level and 
production mix. In the Dutch context however, we suggest that total 
demand will effectively be inelastic, and the local distortions will enable a 
reallocation of production to more efficient producers. In that case, and 
taking into account also that these distortions are second order effects, 
we conclude that the level and mix effects will not be too harmful and that 
the reallocation effect will be beneficial for obtaining a competitive market 
outcome. The volume and mix distortions occur under both formulations, 
but the uncertainty for the firms in the revenue-based yardstick may 
make the reallocation process less effective.  
The innovation incentives will approach those of competitive markets 
under imperfect information rights, with a consequent undersupply of 
innovation. However, the incentives for learning and catch-up are high, 
which in practical settings when there are externalities between 
innovation, testing and development activities will mitigate the problem. 
A further solution to the service innovation supply would be to offer 
separate contracts to able provider-hospitals (e.g. academic research 
hospitals) to engage in new product development without retaining the 
information rights. Combined with fast learning, the resulting welfare 
effects might be higher than for dispersed innovation and low learning in 
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an incumbent low-powered regulation. 
As concerns robustness to collusion, the cost-based formulation has the 
advantage of using ex post final audited cost, which is more difficult to 
coordinate in a collusive agreement. Revenues and prices are naturally 
more prune to ex ante rigging, particularly in a situation where there 
exists a set of relative DBC weights from the regulator that can act as a 
focal point of stipulated “prices”. The revenue-based regime is also prune 
to distortions from diverging firm preferences, such as benevolent labor, 
public capital and cooperatives. Firms with diverging objectives may lower 
the compensations for investor-owned firms below their participation 
constraints, at least blocking entry to the sector. The cost-based ex post 
regime is also more robust to systematic cost shocks for the sector, being 
picked up and corrected with a lag of one period. The revenue-based 
regime is here dependent on the consistency of pricing decisions to 
correctly identify the systematic from the idiosyncratic cost drivers in the 
annual adjustments, which may be hard in a real situation. 
In terms of information and administration, finally, the two formulations 
do rely on a fairly heavy investment in the DBC reporting system and the 
periodic updating of weights. The cost-based regime has in addition the 
calculation of standardized costs for the hospitals, which the revenue-
based regime does not need. However, the administrative footprint of the 
cost-based yardstick scheme might be substantially mitigated depending 
on whether the regulatory audited costs are also necessary for other 
tasks of the NZa, or for information provision to stakeholders and 
shareholders of hospitals (e.g. compliance with cost-level data 
requirements of the security exchange regulator for stock-listed 
companies).
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Table -1 Evaluation of the properties for the price-cap and the revenue yardstick
Type of revenue-cap
Criterion Cost-based price cap
Ex ante
Revenue yardstick
Ex post
Cost-efficiency High incentives High incentives
Full efficiency Full efficiency
Production level and 
mix distortions
Distortions depend on cost 
efficiency and strictness of 
regulation
Distortions depend on cost 
efficiency and strictness of 
regulation
Rent extraction Rent reduction driven by 
profit
Multiple equilibria
Incentives: process 
innovation
High incentives for learning High incentives for learning
Incentives: new 
services
Undersupply compared to 
first-best
Undersupply compared to  
first-best
Incentives: quality 
provision
High if redefined product, 
low otherwise
High if redefined product,  
low otherwise
Robustness to 
collusion 
High (ex post verifiable 
cost)
Low (revenues and price)
Robustness for diverse 
hospital objectives
Mitigated by standardized 
costs
Low (deviant pricing will 
affect the market)
Robustness to  
systematic cost 
shocks
Compensation ex post Distortion downwards 
unless (unlikely) common 
change
Administrative cost High (cost data + 
DBC+waiting lists)
Medium (revenue + 
DBC+waiting lists)
The convergence of the pricing information in the model relies upon some 
assumptions regarding the exogeneity of demand and the observability of 
excess demand. It is important that subsequent reforms of this and the 
adjacent sectors respect and honor these principles, e.g. in terms of the 
vertical separation between the gatekeepers, the insurers and the care 
givers. 
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7.  Appendix A:  
Numerical estimates of distortions
Consider a single-product case with a hospital cost function 
parameterized as C(y)=aya where the parameter a expresses the 
convexity of the production function and a scaling parameter a ≥ 0 it’s 
level. Let the benefit function B(y)=yb with 0 < b ≤ 1 be defined as the 
envelope of pseudo-concave utility functions. Initially, we ignore the 
competitive effects of the regulation and simply assume an allowable 
payment level R(y)=yf(w) where f(w) is the potential outcome of the 
yardstick mechanism using relative prices w, with f(w)=1 for a fully 
efficient hospital. 
In Figure 7-1 below and Figure 7-2 on the next page, we show the 
unconstrained and constrained solutions for the case of a = 0.5, a = 2, b 
= 0.75, w = 0.5 and  c = 0.5 and 0.8, respectively. 
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Figure -1 Unconstrained and constrained bargaining with g = 0..
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Figure - Unconstrained and constrained bargaining with g = 0..
Table -1 Numerical example: unconstrained and constrained production levels and 
surplus.
Uncons-
trained
c = 0.5
Adjus-
ted
c = 0.5
Cons-
trained
c = 0.5
Uncons-
trained
c = 0.8 
Adjus-
ted
c = 0.8
Cons-
trained
c = 0.8
y* 0.794 0.794 0.610 0.794 0.794 0.449
rh(y*) 0.263 0.082 0.119 0.421 0.082 0.124
ru(y*) 0.263 0.444 0.385 0.105 0.444 0.324
R* 0.579 0.579
R(y*) 0.397 0.305 0.397 0.224
The effect of the bargaining power is clearly illustrated in Figure 7-3 
through Figure 7-5, where the constrained bargaining is illustrated. When 
the hospital’s bargaining power is low (Figure 7-3), the social welfare 
effects are relative small of the regulation. The interesting case is 
therefore the scenario with hospital domination of the bargaining, in 
which the regulation acts as to countervail the rent exploitation by the 
hospitals towards the users (insurers). 

Nederlandse ZorgautoriteitYardstick competition for multi-product hospitals

0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
Pu ph Neg R_star y_star,( ),( )
Pu ph Neg R_s y_s,( ),( )
Curve y_star ph,( )
Curve y_s ph,( )
Pru R_star y_star,( )
Pru R y_star( ) y_star,( )
Pru R y_s( ) y_s,( )
Pu ph Neg R y_star( ) y_star,( ),( )
Pu ph Neg R y_s( ) y_s,( ),( )
Figure - Constrained bargaining (g = 0.)
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Figure - Constrained bargaining (g = 0.), cf. Figure  .
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Table -1 Numerical example: unconstrained and constrained production levels and 
surplus.
Uncons-
trained
c = 0.5
Adjus-
ted
c = 0.5
Cons-
trained
c = 0.5
Uncons-
trained
c = 0.8 
Adjus-
ted
c = 0.8
Cons-
trained
c = 0.8
y* 0.794 0.794 0.610 0.794 0.794 0.449
rh(y*) 0.263 0.082 0.119 0.421 0.082 0.124
ru(y*) 0.263 0.444 0.385 0.105 0.444 0.324
R* 0.579 0.579
R(y*) 0.397 0.305 0.397 0.224
The effect of the bargaining power is clearly illustrated in Figure 7-3 
through Figure 7-5, where the constrained bargaining is illustrated. When 
the hospital’s bargaining power is low (Figure 7-3), the social welfare 
effects are relative small of the regulation. The interesting case is 
therefore the scenario with hospital domination of the bargaining, in 
which the regulation acts as to countervail the rent exploitation by the 
hospitals towards the users (insurers). 
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The impact of the demand function, or more specifically the slope b of the 
benefit function is illustrated in Figure 7-6 for the case of a = 0.5, a = 2, 
w = 0.5, c = 0.5. The unconstrained production level y** is monotonously 
increasing with decreasing concavity, which confirms the intuition of 
demand curve exploitation. In Figure 7-7 and Figure 7-8 the welfare loss, 
measured as the difference in welfare W(y) = b(y) – C(y) is illustrated as 
a function of its slope b. As the bargaining space is in the form of an 
ellipsoid, the welfare loss is not monotone when the unconstrained 
optimum is close to the ends of the interval.   
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Figure - Impact of concavity of the benefit function.
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Figure - Impact on unconstrained and constrained bargaining by the slope a of 
the cost function.
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Table - Sensitivity analysis of concavity of benefit function, welfare losses and 
curvature.
a 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
a 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
w 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
c 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
b 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.75 0.9 1.0
y** 0.298 0.409 0.493 0.63 0.694 0.794 0.909 1.000
rh(y**) 0.105 0.121 0.125 0.117 0.106 0.082 0.041 0.000
ru(y**) 0.737 0.632 0.562 0.479 0.456 0.444 0.463 0.500
R** 0.465 0.46 0.465 0.496 0.522 0.579 0.665 0.750
R(y**) 0.149 0.204 0.246 0.315 0.347 0.397 0.454 0.500
W(y**) 0.842 0.753 0.687 0.595 0.562 0.526 0.505 0.500
y* 0.131 0.223 0.304 0.449 0.516 0.61 0.703 0.768
rh(y*) 0.057 0.087 0.106 0.124 0.125 0.119 0.104 0.089
ru(y*) 0.751 0.629 0.598 0.449 0.414 0.385 0.377 0.384
R* 0.149 0.204 0.246 0.315 0.347 0.397 0.454 0.500
R(y*) 0.065 0.111 0.152 0.225 0.258 0.305 0.352 0.384
W(y*) 0.807 0.716 0.654 0.569 0.539 0.504 0.481 0.475
W(y**)-
W(y*)
0.035 0.037 0.033 0.026 0.023 0.022 0.024 0.025
y**-y* 0.167 0.186 0.189 0.181 0.178 0.184 0.206 0.232
The numerical illustrations show that the regulation may lead to some 
distortions in production level. The distortion in physical terms will decline 
as the elasticity of demand gets smaller. The dead-weight loss, i.e. the 
loss of social welfare, may increase as illustrated in the example. This is a 
consequence of the fact that as the elasticity of demand diminishes, any 
physical distortion also becomes more costly in terms of social welfare.
Analytical example
Consider a given hospital. We now assume that the users’ benefits are 
linear in treatments, costs are quadratic, and the bargaining powers are 
equal
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bh(yh)=yh    ch(yh)=(yh)
2    ch=cu=0.5
It is clear that unregulated bargaining will lead to the socially optimal 
outcome yh=0.5 and a settled payment somewhere between 0.25 and 0.5. 
Also, as long as long as the regulated ph is 1 or above, the regulation will 
not matter. With equal bargaining power, the parties would settle for a 
payment (defined one way or the other in a contract) of 3/8 for yh=0.5. 
This is equivalent of a unit price of ¾. Hence, if the regulation price is 
ph ≥ 0.75and that parties are equally powerful, the regulation will not 
matter.
If ph < 0.75, however, the regulation will matter. In this case, the 
bargaining would solve
max
max
b y R R c y
y p y p y y
y h h h h h h
y h h h h h
2
h
h h
- -
- -
__ __
_ `
i i i i
i j
To understand the implications of this, assume for example that that  , i.e. 
the regulator uses a unit price equal to average costs at the optimal 
production level. In this case, we see that the bargaining leads to yh=1/3, 
i.e. a fall in production below first best production level.
This illustrates that even though the production initially is optimal, the 
regulation even though it uses average costs (possibly of other and 
similar units) will cause it to be too low in this next period. In this case, 
there regulation does not support the optimal production level.
In terms of convergence, we see that the production level actually 
diverges from the optimal level. This is especially clear when we continue 
the regulation. In the next period, the production level of 1/3 would make 
us infer that average costs are 1/3, and using this in the third period we 
get even lower production, namely yh=2/9.
As another example, we may image that the hospital has all the 
bargaining power. It would then in an unregulated past set price equal to 
1 and produce 0.5. The average costs at this production level (for other 
hospitals that we believe are similar) would be 0.5 and in the next period 
the hospital would choose output level ¼. The average costs is now ¼ and 
in the third period, the hospital would produce 1/8 etc. 
The numerical illustration and the first analytical example clearly show 
the main characteristics of the regime: the shift of the bargaining power 
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to the users and the limitation of the information rent. Whereas a mere 
reduction (cap) of the revenues for the hospital might violate the 
individual rationality constraint, the adjusted constrained optimization 
reestablishes part of the information rent for the hospital, yet at a lower 
level than in a pure bilateral bargaining. However, as any regulatory 
constraint, this provision of incentives is a second-best solution that 
comes at a social cost. The distortion is proportional to the elasticity of 
the demand and the convexity of the cost function. From this we can infer 
that
—  The regulation may not support the optimal production level in all 
cases when it is active
—  The regulation may in fact make the production level diverge more and 
more from the optimal production level
—  The divergence is faster the more bargaining power the hospital has. 
In other words, the usage of average costs and the tendency to react 
to marginal costs leads to distorted production. This distortion is 
present as long as the hospital has some bargaining power – but it is 
less dramatic the more power the insurance companies have. Hence, 
real bargaining dampens the regulatory distortions – but it will not 
eliminate it.
To sum up, we have demonstrated that some distortions in production 
level are possible. The distortions in production level demonstrated in the 
numerical and analytical examples presume, however, a demand that is 
somewhat price sensitive. In the Dutch context, and given the universal 
insurance and the fact that the general practitioners serve as gate-
keepers independently of the insurance companies, it is likely that the 
demand for the vast majority of DBCs is entirely price-inelastic. In that 
case, the distortions will tend to vanish. In that case, the only role of the 
regulation is to give the users more bargaining power so that they can 
keep a larger share of the social gains. 
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